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use#LAAAbstract: The federal government possesses broad powers under Section 361
of the Public Health Service Act to regulate the entry and spread of communi-
cable diseases into and among the United States. Though this power has played
a central role in United States history since the time of the colonies and remains
important today, no complete history of its development and use exists. In our
era of almost unlimited communicable disease possibilities, to ignore past expe-
rience is folly—a waste of informational resources that could prove instructive
today. This paper attempts to ﬁll that gap, providing a policy history to explain
the evolution of federal quarantine and inspection powers.
Through Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act, Congress has endowed the Surgeon General with the
responsibility and power to:
[M]ake and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduc-
tion, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States
or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.1
The breadth of this power is matched only by the importance of its goal. The evolution of federal quarantine
law into its present form has been driven primarily by an intermittent series of deadly epidemics. Since
the colonial era until the passage of the Public Health Service Act of 1944, the power to protect against
external threats of communicable diseases had gradually shifted from state and local authorities to federal
authorities. This federal power expanded from protection against communicable diseases of foreign origin to
include protection against the interstate transmission of communicable diseases as well. The statute’s breadth
is evidenced by its application, governing the inspection and quarantine of subjects as varied as humans,
turtles, and used tire casings. As air travel revolutionized the speed and volume with which foreign travelers
and immigrants reach the United States, the Public Health Service’s legal power became a less salient issue
than its ability to enforce that power. Because of the impossibility of fully screening the tidal wave of
entering people and commerce, the late twentieth century brought a shift from the paradigm of borders as
disease barriers to the paradigm of global disease prevention. In our world of global travel and potential
1bioterrorism, current thinkers seem stymied by the task of creating an eﬀective federal communicable disease
control policy. If, as Senator Bill Frist argues, In the war against bioterrorism, information is power, then
historical information about communicable disease control appears to be an untapped resource.2 This paper
attempts to chart the history of federal communicable disease control in a way that puts the evolution of
this broad power in context and illuminates some lessons from our past that may help provide a safer future.
Origins of Federal Quarantine and Inspection Laws
The connection between seafaring and the spread of illness has been recognized at least since the Venetians
imposed the ﬁrst known quarantine in the early 14th century. The term itself comes from the Italian word
for forty, denoting the number of days ships arriving from suspect ports were detained before being allowed
to disembark in Venice.3 It is not surprising, then, that the towns of the original American colonies began
to impose quarantines as early as 1647, when the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted the ﬁrst quarantine
restriction in colonial America. This regulation required the quarantine of ships from Barbados due to the
threat of plague.4 The belief evidenced in this 1647 law, that disease could be prevented by prohibitions
against the entry of a foreign source, underlies the paradigm of communicable disease prevention that would
dominate federal quarantine laws for the next three centuries.
2Frist, Sen. William H., M.D., When Every Moment Counts. Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2002,
pp. 19.
3Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 63.
4Ibid., pp. 64-65.
2In 1662, the ﬁrst land-based quarantine in the future United States was instituted in the town of East
Hampton, Long Island. The entry in the Town Records for March 2, 1662 orders:
...that no Indian shall come to towne into the street after suﬃcient notice upon penalty of
5s. or be whipped until they be free of the smallpoxe...and if any English or Indian servant
shall go to their wigwams they shall suﬀer the same punishment.5
Though intended to prevent disease transmission from a domestic (rather than foreign) source, this regulation
continues the pattern of concentrating on protecting a deﬁned community from a disease that threatens from
outside that community. Attempts to protect against smallpox recur throughout the history of American
quarantine, leading to a victorious period of worldwide eradication as well as our current fears of the disease
as a potential terrorist weapon.
Following these ﬁrst quarantines, other colonial governments gradually instituted their own measures for
preventing the introduction of disease from without. At the turn of the 18th century, the predominant
concern was about diseases (primarily smallpox and yellow fever) coming in by sea from foreign ports, rather
than domestic sources.6 A law enacted by Pennsylvania in 1700 is typical of the quarantine provisions of
this time, prohibiting sickly vessels coming into the government.7 Though most colonies enacted quarantine
laws, there was no clear consensus as to which level of government would have authority over this task; cities
and other localities enacted quarantine statutes as well.8
The Colonial Government of New York began the most sophisticated formal quarantine system in the nation
in 1754, funding quarantine hospitals through a tax imposed on all seamen and passengers entering at the
port of New York.9 This move was largely motivated by recurring outbreaks of yellow fever which ﬁgured
6Ibid., pp. 65-66.
7Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 65.
8The City of Charleston in the Province of Carolina enacted a quarantine law on June 7, 1712. Ibid., pp. 65.
9Ibid., pp. 67-68.
3signiﬁcantly in New York and Philadelphia from 1723 to 1822.10 While these sorts of quarantine measures
seem prudent and necessary, one cannot ignore a level of panic surrounding the spread of contagious diseases.
At the time, the causes of yellow fever and smallpox were unknown, and public fear abounded.11 The yellow
fever epidemic in Philadelphia in the summer of 1793 exempliﬁes the fear prompted by that disease. A
month after the disease ﬁrst appeared that year, Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott visited the city,
noting that the streets and roads leading from the city were crouded [sic] with families ﬂying in every
direction for safety to the country.12 By a month later, Wolcott wrote the apprehensiveness of the citizens
cannot be increased; business is in great measure abandoned; the true character of man is disclosed, and he
shows himself a weak, timid, desponding and selﬁsh being.13 The citizens of New York were in a similar
state of panic that they might import the disease trampling Philadelphia: In New York bands of vigilantes
were organized to patrol the streets lest fugitives from Philadelphia slip into the town by night,14. Less
intimidating measures were taken as well; Boston held ships from Philadelphia for cleansing with vinegar
and gunpowder. Among those remaining in Philadelphia, some chewed garlic all day, while even women and
children smoked cigars in the hopes of warding oﬀ disease through rumored preventatives.15
The federal government ﬁrst became involved in quarantine in the 1790’s, beginning with some halting ﬁrst
steps at the periphery of a federal quarantine presence. In 1789, the First Congress appointed a committee to
draft and introduce a bill to provide for the care of sick and disabled merchant seamen. Though the bill did
10Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 66. A particularly vicious epidemic of yellow fever in
1793 in then-capital of Philadelphia caused the federal government to cease operations. Spiegel, Jayson L., Reinforce Our First
Line of Defense. The Washington Post, Sunday, January 20, 2002. B2.
11Fear of smallpox was complicated by the fear of its new potential solution – inoculation. Angry crowds burned a hospital
in Salem, Massachusetts in 1774 in order to prevent its use as an inoculation hospital. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D.,
The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public Health
Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 67.
12Gibbs, George. Memoirs of the administrations of Washington and John Adams. New York: printed for the subscribers,
1846, vol. 1, pp. 110. Quoted in Smith, Geddes, A Plague on Us, The Commonwealth Fund, Oxford University Press, 1941,
pp. 12.
13Smith, Geddes, A Plague on Us, The Commonwealth Fund, Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 12.
14Ibid, pp. 13.
15Ibid, pp. 12.
4not survive committee, this was the ﬁrst sign of federal interest in regulating the health of the vessels coming
to and from our shores.16 On June 9, 1794, Congress passed the ﬁrst federal law relative to quarantine,
granting federal consent to the state of Maryland’s law imposing a duty on vessels coming into the district
of Baltimore from foreign ports in order to pay for a health oﬃcer at the Port of Baltimore.17 Prior to
this, states had not been permitted to charge duties on arriving ships for any reason. The Act of April
3, 1794 indirectly suggested a federal response to quarantine power, by authorizing Congress to meet at a
place other than the seat of government when a prevalence of contagious sickness existed.18 It was not until
1796, however, that Congress addressed the larger question of federal involvement in quarantine directly.
An Act Relative to Quarantine, passed on May 27, 1796, gave the President authority to direct the revenue
oﬃcers and oﬃcers commanding forts and revenue cutters to aid in the execution of quarantine and in the
execution of the health laws of the states.19 This ﬁrst oﬃcial move toward federal aid in the execution of
state quarantine laws laid a template for future constructions of law that would cast the federal government
in the role of providing requested assistance, but not directing action.
The 1798 Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen created an agency that would eventually be
responsible for providing this assistance – the Marine Hospital Service (predecessor to the present Public
Health Service). The Act provided that the salaries of sailors be taxed to fund the construction of marine
hospitals and to provide medical care to merchant seamen, creating what the National Institutes of Health
now refers to as the ﬁrst prepaid medical care plan in the United States.20 Because the Marine Hospital
Service was created to serve merchant seamen, a vital component of commerce, it was housed in the Treasury
16Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 163-164.
17Ibid., pp. 68.
18This action was taken in response to the yellow fever outbreak in Philadelphia that year. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D.,
The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public Health
Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 68.
19An Act relative to Quarantine, May 27, 1796. Fourth Congress, Session I, Ch. 31, 32.
20An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, July 16, 1798, 1 Stat. L. 605. www.nih.gov, NIH timeline, and Mullan,
Fitzhugh, Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service. Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1989, pp.
17.
5Department.21 Though the law did not explicitly direct the agency to prevent the spread of contagious
diseases, its goal of creating federal medical resources to aid the health of those most likely to carry diseases
into the United States from overseas hints at its later use for this purpose.22
Soon after creating the Marine Hospital Service, Congress tasked the Treasury with the duty to observe and
assist in the quarantine laws of the states. On February 25, 1799, An Act Respecting Quarantine and Health
Laws replaced the Act of May 1796, reﬂecting a more developed notion of what was involved in creating
a federal quarantine institution.23 The statute retained the model of federal agency as assistant to state
authorities, directing United States oﬃcers to observe state quarantine and health laws, and authorizing
the Secretary of the Treasury to assist states in their eﬀorts to enforce those laws.24 The language of the
statute evinces that its primary concern was disease borne on seafaring vessels, rather than traveling over
land; this reﬂects the emerging view of the time that while general health regulations lay beyond federal
purview, federal involvement in health regulations relating to international travel might be appropriate.
Aside from authorizing the federal government to assist the states in enforcing their own quarantine laws,
the 1799 Act contained a provision allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to vary the regulations relative to
the entry and report of vessels and their cargoes. Speciﬁcally, the statute authorized the Secretary:
21www.nih.gov, NIH timeline.
22The biography of the bill’s major Congressional proponent gives some support to the notion that the bill’s framers con-
templated the Marine Hospital Service’s involvement in preventing the spread of contagious diseases. Congressman Edward
Livingston, of New York, from the Committee on Commerce and Manufacturing, reported a bill for the relief of sick and
disabled seamen. ....[Livingston] served as a member of Congress from New York from 1795 to 1801. He was selected by
Thomas Jeﬀerson as United States District Attorney for New York in 1801. He became Mayor of New York City in August
of that year. During 1803 he rendered conspicuous service in the yellow fever epidemic that occurred in New York City and
contracted the disease. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned
Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 164.
23An Act respecting Quarantine and Health Laws, February 25, 1799. Fifth Congress, Session III, Ch. 12.
24Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
quarantines and other restraints, which shall be required and established by the health laws of any state, or pursuant thereto,
respecting any vessels arriving in, or bound to, any port or district thereof, whether from a foreign port or place, or from
another district of the United States, shall be duly observed by the collectors and all other oﬃcers of the revenue of the United
States, ....and all such oﬃcers of the United States shall be, and they hereby are, authorized and required, faithfully to aid
in the execution of such quarantines and health laws, according to their respective powers and precincts, and as they shall be
directed, from time to time, by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. From An Act respecting Quarantine and
Health Laws, February 25, 1799. Fifth Congress, Session III, Ch. 12.
6when a conformity to such quarantines and health laws shall require it, and in respect to
vessels which shall be subject thereto, to prolong the terms limited for the entry of the same,
and the report or entry of their cargoes, and to vary or dispense with any other regulations
applicable to such reports or entries.25
Though this appears to give the Secretary power to depart from state laws and institute his own regulations,
this power extends only so far as the underlying state quarantine laws allow. The statute only authorizes
variations from regulations of reports and entries if those regulations conﬂict with the requirements of the
state quarantine and health laws. Thus, this statute does not actually authorize the federal government to
make any law relating to quarantine that would supercede state quarantine laws.
The 1799 Act includes two other provisions that reﬂect the early state of development of federal quarantine
powers. The ﬁrst of these was a provision that reﬂected a signiﬁcant concern about state quarantine laws at
the time—that the protection of public health would become a pretext for graft and economic protectionism.
For this reason, the statute orders that ...nothing herein shall enable any state to collect a duty of tonnage
or impost without the consent of the Congress of the United States thereto,26. This expresses Congress’ clear
desire for a separation of powers that would require Congressional permission to tax any incoming vessel
(as was allowed in the case of the Port of Baltimore in 1794). The other provision revealing the developing
concern about communicable disease at the time might be seen as the ﬁrst federal provision for public health
emergencies. The Act provides that in the case of prevalence of any contagious or epidemic disease at a
port, the Secretary of the Treasury could order the removal of revenue oﬃcers, the President could order
the removal of public oﬃces, the courts could decide to remove themselves, and a district judge could order
the removal of all prisoners from that port to a safe location.27 This provision also lays out the ﬁrst clear
division of responsibility between government actors in the event of a breakout of a dangerous disease.
26An Act respecting Quarantine and Health Laws, February 25, 1799. Fifth Congress, Session III, Ch. 12.
27Ibid.
7The assignment of federal power to help enforce state quarantine laws created some confusion as to whether
this in some way lent federal authority to state quarantine laws. The 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden illustrates
some of the role confusion raised by this melding of functions. In Gibbons, the Supreme Court struck as
unconstitutional a New York law that granted exclusive navigation rights to two individuals for the entire
waters of New York. In doing so, the Court rejected the State’s argument that the federal government’s
prior assistance in enforcing New York’s quarantine regulations signiﬁed federal sanction of those laws as
consistent with the Constitution: Congress only directs oﬃcers of government to obey state quarantine laws
but does not pretend, or attempt, to legalize them.28 This ﬁrmly established that, although federal powers
would be used to help enforce state laws regarding maritime travel, it would neither negate the commerce
power nor federalize state quarantine laws.
While the meaning of this federal aid was being deﬁned, Congress appropriated to the Secretary of the
Treasury greater power to implement it. Between 1832 and 1834, serious outbreaks of cholera traveled up
the Mississippi River from the Gulf Coast, spreading that disease and the fear of it into areas which had
previously seemed safe from the reach of coastal diseases.29 In response to this epidemic, Congress passed
An Act to Enforce Quarantine Regulations on July 13, 1832, empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to
allocate ships and oﬃcers to aid in the enforcement of state quarantine and health laws.30 This statute did
not materially change the powers of the federal government to interfere with quarantine laws, maintaining
the federal health role as assistant to state authority. It did, however, materially increase the usefulness of
this power to the states and it increased the federal presence at state ports.
28Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 US 1, 9.
29Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 70.
30Be it enacted...That if, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, the revenue cutters, revenue boats, or revenue
oﬃcers, employed or authorized to be employed for the purposes of the revenue, should be insuﬃcient to aid in the execution
of the quarantine and health laws of any state, or the regulations made pursuant thereto, the said Secretary may cause to be
employed such additional revenue boats and revenue oﬃcers as he may deem necessary for that purpose, the said revenue boats
to be of such size and description as he may see proper. This act to continue in force until the fourth of March, one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-three. – Approved, July 13, 1832. From An Act to enforce quarantine regulations, July 13, 1832.
Twenty-Second Congress, Session I, Ch. 202, 203, 204.
8Though the federal government and the states clearly understood that the epidemic diseases of the time
were transported by boat, there was by no means a clear understanding of their modes of transmission. One
Senate report on quarantine in 1854 stated that cholera appeared to have no cause, but emerged at random
except for a possible correlation with poor sanitation. The understanding of typhus (or ship fever) was
more colorful, if no more advanced. The Senate Report identiﬁed the cause of typhus as being a poisonous
vapor particular to ships, which was made of a combination of the decomposition of bodily excretions and
moisture from perspiration and breath.31 Though people of the time did not understand disease transmission,
they were becoming all too familiar with the consequences of epidemics. One particularly disastrous yellow
fever outbreak on Staten Island and Long Island, New York in 1856, underscored the level of public fear
engendered by the prevailing contagious diseases of the time. Attributed to lax enforcement of quarantine
laws, the 1856 New York outbreak caused over 500 cases of yellow fever, and led angry locals to barricade
the quarantine station on Staten Island.32 Though New York health authorities responded by moving the
quarantine station several miles away, the locals were not paciﬁed. When new yellow fever patients arrived
the following summer, an armed mob burned the quarantine hospital to the ground.33
Post-Civil War Communicable Disease Control:The Fight Against Yellow Fever and the Acts of 1878-1879
The Civil War years did not weaken the nation’s quarantine abilities, but strengthened them through in-
creased appropriations and an inﬂux of military medical oﬃcers who would become, in eﬀect, government
31Bennett, Victoria L., Medical Examination of Aliens: A Policy with Ailments of its Own? University of Arkansas at Little
Rock Law Journal, Fall 1989, v. 12, n. 4, pp. 739-753, pp. 741.
32The Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1888. JAMA 12:22. Jan. 5, 1889.
33Ibid.
9doctors.34 These expanded resources came largely in response to cholera and yellow fever. Due to the preva-
lence of cholera, in 1866, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the Secretaries of War and Navy to
place ships at the disposal of quarantine oﬃcers at United States ports.35 Though this action remained in
eﬀect for only one year, it added to the gradual progress of increased federal ability to aid in disease control.
Another law passed in 1866, however, contributed far more to federal quarantine power. The Act of May
26, 1866 granted to the Secretary of the Treasury, for the ﬁrst time, the power to make its own regulations
regarding quarantine against cholera.36 Though this grant of power was also a response to a temporary
epidemic expiring in one year, it broke trail into a new area in which the federal government would not just
assist, but at times also direct, quarantine regulations. 37
The recurrences of deadly epidemics (particularly yellow fever) in the southern states in the mid-19th century
led the post-war Congress to concentrate federal quarantine eﬀorts in the South. On June 6, 1872, Congress
passed a Joint Resolution Providing for a More Eﬀective System of Quarantine on the Southern and Gulf
Coasts, which authorized the Secretary of War to evaluate and rehaul southern states’ quarantine policies in
light of the yellow fever threat.38 The choice to locate this power with the Secretary of War, rather than the
usual seat of quarantine power – the Secretary of the Treasury, requires explanation. This provision does not
34Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 165.
35Joint Resolution authorizing the Secretaries of War and Navy to place Hulks and Vessels at the Disposal of the Commis-
sioners of Quarantine, or other proper Authorities, at Ports of the United States, for one Year., March 24, 1866. Thirty-Ninth
Congress, Session I, Res. 16.
36Joint Resolution respecting Quarantine and Health Laws., May 26, 1866. Thirty-ninth Congress, Session I, Res. 42.
37Be it resolved...That the Secretary of the Treasury be, ...authorized to make and carry into eﬀect such orders and
regulations of quarantine as, in his opinion, may be deemed necessary and proper, in aid of State or municipal authorities,
to guard against the introduction of cholera into the ports of the United States; and the Secretary of the Treasury is further
authorized to direct the revenue oﬃcers and the oﬃcers commanding revenue cutters to aid in the execution of such quarantine,
and also in the execution of the health laws of the States respectively in such manner as may to him seem necessary....provided
the authority hereby granted shall expire on the ﬁrst Monday in January, [1867]. – Approved May 26, 1866. Joint Resolution
respecting Quarantine and Health Laws., May 26, 1866. Thirty-ninth Congress, Session I, Res. 42. During this time, federal
health oﬃcers and Congress were considering the reorganization and expansion of the Marine Hospital Service. The Act of June
29, 1870 provided for reorganization of the Marine Hospital Service, and established a central oﬃce in Washington for the agency.
Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the
United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 165.
38Joint Resolution providing for a more eﬀective System of Quarantine on the Southern and Gulf Coasts., June 6, 1872.
Forty-Second Congress, Session II, Res. 6.
10represent a change in authority, but a supplemental power to capitalize on military medical oﬃcers’ famil-
iarity with Southern health conditions.39 In addition, the assignment of this responsibility to the Secretary
of War reﬂected that much of the Marine Hospital Service’s own resources had been subsumed by the war
eﬀort.40
The language of the statute itself shows an interesting variation on the usual formula of directing federal
quarantine oﬃcers to aid in the enforcement of state laws. Because of a dearth of organized quarantine
systems in the south (and a lack of state boards of health in southern states at this time41), the language
directs army medical oﬃcers to:
...visit each town or port on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast, which
is subject or liable to invasions of yellow fever, and ...confer with the authorities of such
port or town, with reference to the establishment of a more uniform and eﬀective system of
quarantine, and ...ascertain all facts having reference to the outbreaks of this disease in such
ports or towns, and whether any system of quarantine is likely to be eﬀective in preventing
invasions of yellow fever, and, if so, what system will least interfere with the interests of
commerce at said ports... 42
Though the statute directs the federal medical oﬃcer to advise, rather than direct, local authorities, it clearly
authorizes federal medical oﬃcers to do more than simply help enforce local laws. This more intrusive role
of the federal medical oﬃcer may have been justiﬁed by the time limits of the statute, which designed this
action to end with a report on the topics to the Secretary six months later.43
Despite sporadic attempts to use federal resources to improve state and local quarantine systems throughout
the 19th century, by 1875, the eﬀect was seen as relatively insigniﬁcant. One Public Health Service historian
39Ibid.
40Mullan, Fitzhugh, Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service. Basic Books, Inc., New
York, 1989., pp. 23-25.
41Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 113.
43Ibid. A later statute authorized similar action in response to another outbreak in March of 1874. Act of March 25, 1874.
Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of
the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 115.
11noted that The enforcement of quarantine regulations, inconsistent as they were from locality to locality,
was variable and often nonexistent. In 1875 [Supervising Surgeon General John Maynard] Woodworth
characterized the federal quarantine law as a ’dead letter’.44 Part of this lack of success resulted from the
requirement that federal medical oﬃcers wait for local authorities to request assistance before intervening in
quarantine procedures. This impotence collided with the Surgeon General’s ambitious goals for the Marine
Hospital Service (MHS). From the beginning of his tenure, Woodworth aspired to use the MHS not only
for the care of merchant seamen, but to provide health services to the entire nation. The predominance of
epidemic outbreaks (primarily cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever) led him to see the quarantine power as
central to achieving this goal of a more universal health service. 45 Woodworth attempted to increase the
MHS’s role in quarantine by issuing a memo to his medical oﬃcers that deﬁned their quarantine duties and
ordered them to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the local health laws at their ports, and to obey
these laws and render prompt assistance in their enforcement when requested.46
At the same time that Woodworth was trying to increase federal control over quarantine, an important and
connected move toward federalization in the area of immigration was taking place. In 1875, the Supreme
Court struck as unconstitutional all state laws regarding foreign immigration, giving the federal government
sole authority to regulate immigration. This case, Chy Lung v. Freeman et al., involved a California statute
excluding certain aliens except upon payment of a bond. In his majority opinion, Justice Miller held the
statute to be unconstitutional because it conﬂicted with the sole authority of Congress to regulate the
admission of aliens.47 This ruling left the states with a gaping need for federal assistance in dealing with
the many services required by immigration, including the task of protecting against the contagious diseases
44Mullan, Fitzhugh, Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service. Basic Books, Inc., New
York, 1989., pp. 23-25.
45Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 72.
46Duties of the United States Oﬃcers with Reference to Quarantine and the Public Health, Department No. 90, September
8, 1874. See also, Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers
Association of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 75.
47Chy Lung v. Freeman et al., 92 U.S. 275 (Sup. Ct., 1875 Term)
12some immigrants carried to their shores.48
Woodworth continued his campaign to empower the MHS’s quarantine eﬀorts at the International Medical
Congress in 1876. At the conference, he argued for the need for a national quarantine system, with a
concentration on working toward uniformity in the system. Woodworth’s arguments were not aimed at
making it more diﬃcult for vessels to dock at U.S. ports. On the contrary, he believed that quarantine could
become more predictable and eﬀective through a uniform system of: inspections of arriving vessels, medical
examinations of those on board, and shorter required periods spent in quarantine detention. This last reform
was an attempt to end some ports’ practice of detaining vessels from infected ports for longer than the period
of incubation of the disease which was being contained. Woodward argued that once the disease had run its
course and was no longer contagious, there was no reason for ships to remain in quarantine at tremendous
cost to their owners and crew.49
Though Woodworth’s eﬀorts did not meet with immediate success, the next year brought events that helped
advance his cause. In the summer of 1877, a ruinous epidemic of yellow fever spread up the Mississippi from
New Orleans.50 This pattern of yellow fever outbreaks, spreading up through the southern states from New
Orleans, continued over the next year with disastrous consequences. The epidemic of the following summer
led to roughly 27,000 cases of yellow fever and over 4,000 deaths in New Orleans, and killed almost ten
percent of the populations of Memphis and Vicksburg.51 Overall, the yellow fever epidemic that traveled
the Mississippi in 1878 took more than 100,000 victims.52 The level of fear and devastation inherent in this
48Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 102.
49Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 73.
50Mullan, Fitzhugh, Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service. Basic Books, Inc., New
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52One of the only ﬁrst-hand accounts of this epidemic came from a telegraph operator in Grenada, Mississippi. His story is
told here by Geddes Smith, in his book Plague on Us: The ﬁrst cases of sickness appearing in the little town were dismissed as
’bilious fever.’ The local board of health on August 11 reluctantly admitted the presence of an epidemic. Three days later all
13experience is hard for us to imagine today; entire towns along the Mississippi were deserted as rumors of
yellow fever surfaced in the days prior to its actual arrival, and local citizens enforced quarantines at the
point of shotguns.53 This panic, which made dealing with the epidemic even more diﬃcult than it would
have otherwise been, is understandable in light of the lack of available information about what caused the
disease. As a result, a commission appointed by Congress after the 1878 outbreaks investigated the cause
and transmission of both yellow fever and cholera.54 Even the best medical minds of the time were unable to
identify the true mode of transmission of yellow fever, concluding only that further eﬀorts should be directed
toward chemical disinfectants and that quarantine and sanitation played an important role in disease control.
As Geddes Smith wrote, yellow fever presented a particularly diﬃcult epidemiological conundrum: [A] disease
which clearly was not transmitted directly from person to person and which nevertheless spread from one
place to another with human travel was too puzzling to handle in any logical way until, years later, the
mosquito was identiﬁed as middleman.55
The story of one yellow fever infected towboat, the John D. Porter, reveals the inability of health oﬃcers
to control the spread of this epidemic. Originating in New Orleans, the Porter set out for Pittsburgh with
a string of barges, but had stopped as early as Vicksburg to bury two crew members who had succumbed
to the disease. By the time the boat reached Memphis, soon after losing another crew member to yellow
but 700 of the 2,200 white inhabitants had ﬂed. Only the undertakers’ shops and drugstores were open. With windows closed,
trains went through the village without slackening speed. Except for physicians and nurses from Memphis and New Orleans,
the town was cut oﬀ from the world. On August 15 there were 300 white people left, half of whom were sick. Two days later
there were 200 and only 30 or 40 of these persons were well. The telegrapher in writing his story said, ’Surely the end cannot
be far and the chapter must be soon closed.’ A few days later he recorded that ’No one had dared to enter the town for several
days. When we are gone, God only knows what will become of the stricken.’
On the 22nd of August, word reached the village that the War Department was sending tents for refugees but the question
was who would put them up. ’There are not 20 active men in town.’ The telegrapher indicated that there was one corpse and
four sick persons in the house where he lived. The dispatches from the telegrapher grew more brief. On August 29, there was
little more than a list of the recent dead, 22 in 24 hours, and the telegrapher signed oﬀ with the despairing statement, ’In spite
of all the doctors can do, death seems to reign supreme.’ Two days later, he too was dead. The story is still told in Grenada
that he died at his telegraph key. Smith, Geddes, A Plague on Us, The Commonwealth Fund, Oxford University Press, 1941,
pp. 21.
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14fever, its reputation had spread and the town prevented it from docking. When the boat reached Cincinnati,
after four more deaths, two MHS physicians boarded the ship to care for the sick and attempt to control the
disease, to little avail. As the boat reached Gallopolis, Ohio, those in the crew who were still physically able
pushed past the town’s guards to ﬂee the ship, and subsequently infected thirty-one Gallopolis residents.
When the boat ﬁnally reached her destination, it is recorded that 23 men had died on board and she had
distributed poison through a journey of more than 1,000 miles.56 The inability of the two MHS physicians to
keep the Porter’s crew from spreading disease to port town residents only underscored the need for a more
eﬀective quarantine power.
The yellow fever epidemic’s eﬀects on larger cities like Memphis and New Orleans were no less catastrophic
than its eﬀects on small towns like Gallopolis. In ten days, twenty-ﬁve thousand people ﬂed Memphis, and
one third of the remaining twenty thousand citizens succumbed to the disease. The eﬀects on commerce and
trade were almost as devastating. Communications and trade were stopped almost entirely throughout the
lower Mississippi Valley, and trains headed north were packed full with fearful refugees. Meanwhile, travel
between towns was hampered by the many local quarantines which turned away newcomers at the point of
shotguns. The city of New Orleans estimated that it lost $5,000,000 in commerce due to the 1878 epidemic.57
With the yellow fever tragedies came public and political support for quarantine reform, culminating in the
April 29, 1878 Act to Prevent the Introduction of Contagious or Infectious Diseases into the United States.58
The bill was introduced by Congressman Julian Hartridge of Georgia, reported out by the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and was sponsored in the Senate by Senator Roscoe Conkling of New
York.59 There is little dispute that the bill was able to pass due to a combination of public concern about
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15the ongoing yellow fever epidemic and the extensive eﬀorts of Surgeon-General Woodworth against opposition
by merchants.60 This Act created the Division of Quarantine within the MHS, oﬃcially assigning federal
quarantine responsibility to that agency.61 The Act decisively follows Dr. Woodworth’s pleas that the
federal government be empowered to create regulations of its own to counteract the problems caused by the
inconsistency of state regulations.62 The new law also strengthened federal quarantine authority by making
the MHS the central agency with which incoming vessels would have to deal. Section Two of the statute
directs:
[W]henever any infectious or contagious disease shall appear in any foreign port, or
having on board goods or passengers coming from any place or district infected with
cholera or yellow fever, ...bound for any port in the United States, the consular
oﬃcer, or other representative of the United States at or nearest such foreign port
shall immediately give information thereof to the Supervising Surgeon-General of the
Marine Hospital Service... 63
This centralization of reporting to the MHS strengthened its ability to monitor ships coming from infected
ports or bearing infected passengers. In doing so, Congress placed the coordination of quarantine in federal
hands, with the hopes of solving interstate communication and enforcement problems. Instead of serving
merely as an invited helper to the states, the MHS was now the central recipient of information from federal
oﬃcers abroad, possessing the power to inform and advise states regarding potentially aﬀected ports.64
In addition to shifting the structure of quarantine coordination toward federalization, the 1878 Act also began
to shift regulatory control of the actual quarantine regulations to the federal government. The Act authorizes
the Surgeon-General to create rules and regulations for the purpose of aiding in quarantine enforcement, as
60Ibid., pp. 74, and Jacobson, Sherry, On guard in case of epidemic: States asked to beef up quarantine powers. The Dallas
Morning News, November 19, 2001, Page 1C, pp. 2, and Ackerknecht, Erwin H., Anticontagionism Between 1821 and 1867, 22
Bull. His. Med. 562, 567 (1948), pp. 567.
61Satcher, David, M.D., Ph.D. The History of the Public Health Service and the Surgeon General’s Priorities. 54 Food Drug
L.J. 13, 1999, pp. 14.
62Ibid., pp. 13.
64Ibid., Section 4.
16long as those rules did not conﬂict with or impair any sanitary or quarantine laws or regulations of any State
or municipal authorities... 65 The caveat that federal regulations must not contradict state laws reﬂects the
fundamental view that quarantine and health regulation ought to remain a key state police power. In some
ways, the statute went even further than simply allowing the Surgeon General to create regulations for MHS
oﬃcers to follow; it also authorized state and municipal health oﬃcers to act as oﬃcers or agents of the
national quarantine system,66. Putting the federal regulation provision together with this provisions seems
to result in the appropriation of state oﬃcials for the enforcement of federal quarantine regulations. The
statute did provide, however, that there shall be no interference in any manner with any quarantine laws or
regulations as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under State laws.67 Despite this limitation on the
Surgeon General’s quarantine power, however, the new ability to create regulations departed substantially
from mere authorization to aid in the enforcement of state laws.
The 1878 Act also enabled Surgeon-General Woodworth to organize a yellow fever commission which studied
the problem in southern states, and changed the MHS from a collection of locally controlled hospitals
to a nationally coordinated and controlled system: The loosely connected aggregation of local appointee
physicians ...was ...converted into a homogeneous mobile medical corps whose members were available for
service in any part of the country whenever directed.68 Despite this bold improvement in federal capability,
the 1878 Act did not give the federal government suﬃcient authority to create regulations for inspection and
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17disinfection of vessels. The inability to interfere or conﬂict with state and municipal quarantine regulations
tied the hands of federal health oﬃcers too much to create a uniform system of quarantine.69 This limitation,
combined with continuing yellow fever epidemics, led Congress to take even further action, creating the
National Board of Health through the Act of March 3, 1879.70 The National Board of Health would take
the place of the Marine Hospital Service with respect to quarantine and inspection, relegating the MHS to
the narrow mission of caring for merchant seamen.71 It seems more than coincidental that this removal of
power from the MHS came soon after the death of its most powerful and successful proponent, Surgeon
General John Maynard Woodworth.72 Though Woodworth’s successor, Dr. John B. Hamilton, was similarly
committed to working toward an eﬀective, uniform quarantine system, the loss of a leader with experience
navigating the Service through such tumultuous times may have left the MHS more politically vulnerable
than in preceding years. 73
Other than changing the seat of federal quarantine power, the Act of March 3, 1879 actually made little
substantive progress toward federalization of quarantine. However, the statute did substantially alter the
mechanics of this process, requiring ships to present certiﬁcates of health from consular or medical oﬃcers
at the point of departure and from the health oﬃcer at their point of entry. In order to implement this
requirement, the statute provided for medical oﬃcers to be assigned to foreign ports at the consular oﬃces
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18in order to perform health inspections.74 This organization of information reporting marked a signiﬁcant
improvement in the ability of health oﬃcers to anticipate which foreign ports and ships might carry infection
and to prepare domestic ports for those threats. Toward this goal, the statute directed the National Board
of Health to submit weekly reports on the sanitary condition of foreign and U.S. ports.75 Perhaps because it
was created to solve the seemingly ﬁnite problem of yellow fever, the National Board of Health was authorized
for only four years, expiring in March 2, 1883.76 After this time, the MHS once again assumed responsibility
for national quarantine and public health, and began to more fully implement the quarantine law of 1878.77
Quarantine procedure around this time was, not surprisingly, directed at the control and prevention of yellow
fever, smallpox, and cholera. In general, when vessels arrived at United States ports, they were required to
anchor at a designated location and were then boarded by the Medical Oﬃcer in Charge of the quarantine
station (or an assistant). Quarantine stations were usually located at a distance from their ports, in response
to local opposition to having potentially infected ships near their shores. The medical oﬃcer reviewed the
ships documents to determine where it had come from and at which ports it had stopped along the way, and
then examined the passengers and crew for signs of the quarantinable diseases.78 Ships that came from ports
which were known to be infected with yellow fever received more exacting treatment, held for the complete
period of incubation of the disease. Similarly, if passengers or crew showed symptoms of either yellow fever
or smallpox, the ship and its passengers were detained in quarantine facilities until the end of the disease’s
incubation period. After this time, if the quarantine oﬃcer found the ship to be free of disease, he would
issue a pratique, (i.e. permission to enter the port) or a provisional pratique, which conditioned entry upon
some restriction (i.e. fumigation or discharge of the cargo).79 The job of the quarantine oﬃcer during this
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19time was a treacherous one, with a number of medical oﬃcers contracting yellow fever each year.80
Interstate Control and Immigrant Inspection
As the 1880’s came to a close, the issue of strengthening federal control over interstate quarantine kept
recurring with the emergence of unmanageable epidemics. In September, 1888, Congress took a tentative
step toward funding such an expanse of federal power, appropriating by joint resolution $200,000 for the
purpose of suppressing infection in interstate commerce.81 Though political support for making the actual
move toward authorizing federal control over interstate quarantine was signiﬁcant, Congress failed to pass An
Act to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases from one State to another, and for the punishment of
certain oﬀenses, which would have authorized federal control over interstate quarantine.82 Since the time was
not yet ripe for federalization, Congress instead took gradual steps to strengthen federal control of quarantine.
In 1888, Congress enacted An Act to Perfect the Quarantine Service of the United States, which provided
for penalties for violations of quarantine laws and established new quarantine stations.83 In addition, and
in reaction to reports of smallpox epidemics in Hong Kong, Congress authorized the construction of a major
quarantine station on California’s Angel Island.84
1890 ﬁnally brought the political impetus to pass an interstate quarantine act, after years of ﬂirting with this
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20power. With the scourge of yellow fever continuing through the summer of 1889, it is not diﬃcult to see why
Congress determined that this action was necessary.85 The bill speciﬁcally authorized the Marine Hospital
Service to prevent the interstate transmission of cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, and bubonic plague.86
It further authorized the Surgeon General to enact rules and regulations to this eﬀect.87 In addition to
permitting previously unknown federal power over interstate quarantine, Congress also soon gave the federal
government power over medical inspection of immigrants. Though Congress had passed an act regarding
immigration in 1882 providing for the exclusion of convicts, lunatics, idiots, and others unable to care
for themselves, it was not until 1891 that Congress provided for the exclusion of those with loathsome or
dangerous contagious disease[s].88 The Act of March 3, 1891 mandated medical inspection of immigrants
at their ports of entry, and assigned that task to the Marine Hospital Service.89 In point of fact, the ﬁrst
medical inspection immigrants of this era encountered was performed by ship-owning companies, at which
point some were excluded from boarding. The ﬁnal word, however was left to MHS oﬃcers at the ship’s
point of entry to the United States.90 The prudence of the Act, clearly aimed at preventing the ingress of
immigrants carrying yellow fever, cholera, and plague, was deemed proved after a cholera epidemic ravaged
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21Europe and Asia the following year.91
The cholera epidemic of 1892 prompted Surgeon General Walter Wyman to press his new powers into almost
immediate use. In July of 1892, Wyman prohibited vessels from certain speciﬁed cholera-infected districts
from entering without a certiﬁcate of disinfection.92 After learning that immigrants with cholera had begun
arriving in August of 1892, Wyman took further action by prohibiting the importation of a widely-known
carrier object of the disease – rags.93 The ban on rags coming from cholera infected ports was absolute, and
even those coming from ports not known to be infected were required to carry a certiﬁcate by the consular
oﬃcer at the port of shipment stating that they had been disinfected.94
These measures, however, were too timid to prevent the immigration of cholera, and the public began to cry
for a halt to all immigration.95 Though the Executive was not empowered to stop immigration at the time,
President Harrison and Surgeon General Wyman sought a way to use quarantine laws to accomplish this
goal.96 In Wyman’s own words:
In reading over the quarantine laws of the States, ...I found that every seaboard State had
the right, under its laws, to enforce a quarantine detention of at least twenty days...[and]
[u]nder the national quarantine act of April 19, 1878, the General Government is authorized
to aid State and local boards, and the principle has bee announced by the highest legal
authority that while, under existing laws, the National Government might not break down
the quarantine barriers of a State, its power is unquestionable to add to these barriers when
it becomes necessary.97
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22Using this power to enforce state quarantine laws, the Surgeon General declared a twenty day quarantine
of all ships, with the full knowledge that the cost of the quarantine to steamship companies would cause
a twenty day halt to all immigration.98 Though the 1892 cholera epidemic caused the deaths of roughly
80,000 in Persia and 300,000 in Russia, these measures limited the scale of disaster in the United States to
a much more minor event.99 Though it referred to a state law regarding exclusion of certain immigrants,
the case of Minneapolis, Saint Paul v. Milner lent some support to the federal government’s laws restricting
immigration and subjecting immigrants to inspection and detention. The Milner court upheld a state’s
power to detain even those passengers from uninfected countries, concluding that inconvenience resulting to
emigrants and travelers from being halted and subjected to examination and detention at state lines is of
triﬂing importance at a time when every eﬀort is required and is being put forth to prevent the introduction
and spread of pestilential and communicable diseases.100
For those who were not prohibited from entry, medical inspection began at Ellis Island on January 1, 1892.
The ﬁrst immigrant to arrive at Ellis Island was ﬁfteen-year-old Annie Moore, whom the New York Times
touted as a rosy-cheeked Irish girl. Pre-selected by immigration oﬃcers to be the preeminent model of
immigration inspection, Moore passed swiftly through the inspection of MHS physicians.101 The method of
inspection at Ellis Island was sometimes referred to as The Line, as each intended immigrant climbed a set of
stairs, to be scrutinized by MHS physicians for signs of excessive exhaustion, deformities, defective posture,
or other apparent irregularities. The most intimidating part of the exam was usually the eye exam, which
involved ﬂipping the immigrant’s eyelids inside out in order to screen for trachoma, a contagious disease
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23which led to blindness.102 The process of delousing also caused some trauma to bewildered incomers, as
they were asked to remove their clothes. Even more disconcerting to some, if disease was detected, the
immigrant was marked with a letter symbolizing his disease and placed in a wire mesh compartment which
bore too great a resemblance to an animal pen or a jail cell.103
Though Miss Moore’s passage through Ellis Island was unchallenging, the medical exams tended to be
more elaborate for those passengers who traveled in the third class or steerage class of their vessels.104 A
directive from the Secretary of the Treasury to United States Customs oﬃcers actually formalized this class
discrepancy, and explained the reasons for it. The Secretary argued that past experience had shown that
passengers from steerage class presented the greatest danger of infectious diseases, due to:
The crowding of immigrants to the extreme limits of the steerage accommodations of many of
the ships, the considerable quantity and the character of their baggage and personal eﬀects,
and the consequent diﬃculty of maintaining those conditions of cleanliness and ventilation
which are demanded by sanitary laws.105
Since these conditions were not present among the cabin passengers, the Treasury Secretary saw no need
to perform inspections of cabin passengers beyond those already being done by the various local health
authorities until 1893.106
Though the cabin versus steerage distinction is not relevant to quarantine and inspection policy today,
another distinction among incoming passengers created in 1892 continues to the present day. Under pressure
from the Commissioner of Immigration, the United States began to diﬀerentiate between incoming passengers
who intended to immigrate permanently and those who merely intended to visit.107 Though the language of
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24the previous regulation (prior to the diﬀerentiation between cabin and steerage passengers) was quite clear
in its direction to examine all passengers, the Commissioner of Immigration wrote to the Secretary of the
Treasury:
It is represented that you have informed steamship companies that you will require
personal examination of all cabin passengers by a surgeon, boarding oﬃcer, and
registry clerks. This is not deemed necessary, and it is probable that you were
misunderstood....You will only detain for examination such foreigners as you have
reason to believe, from such examination or from the passenger list, are removing to
this country for permanent residence.108
The Secretary of the Treasury implemented this policy by presenting this letter itself as a circular to the
department, with no accompanying policy justiﬁcation. Though it follows logically that the longer an
infected visitor remains in the country, the more opportunities he or she will have to infect others, infected
temporary visitors certainly also present danger to the public. It is interesting from a policy perspective
that this distinction was created by the immigration authority, rather than a public health authority. This
may lend credence to the theory that the distinction is aimed at preventing the entrance of people who were
likely to become public charges, rather than those who might spread disease.
Increased immigration and further spread of disease from state to state led Congress to take further steps
toward quarantine federalization in 1893, with An Act Granting Additional Quarantine Powers and Imposing
Additional Duties upon the Marine-Hospital Service.109 The bill included a requirement that all vessels
must obtain a bill of health from a consular or medical oﬃcer of the United States at the port of departure,
detailing the sanitary history of the vessel and stating that it complies with United States sanitation rules.110
In addition, it required weekly reporting on the sanitary conditions of U.S. and foreign ports.111 Clearly
building on Surgeon General Wyman’s immigration suspension in 1892, the statute authorized the President
109An act granting additional quarantine powers and imposing additional duties upon the Marine-Hospital Service. February
15, 1893. Fifty-Second Congress, Session II, Chap. 114.
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25to prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places
as he shall designate for such period of time as he may deem necessary if he perceived a serious danger
of introduction of an infectious disease from a foreign country.112 The Act gave the federal government
the predominant right of quarantine, imbuing the MHS with the responsibility of approving state and local
quarantine facilities and revamping those that failed to meet federal standards. The language of the statute
also speciﬁed that the Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to make regulations to improve quarantine
systems which he deemed to be insuﬃcient.113 This led the several states to phase out their own quarantine
activities over the following years and cede yet more responsibility to the federal government.114
The plentiful legislative history related to this statute provides insight into the debate surrounding federal
quarantine powers in the epidemic years of the late-19th century. A Report of the Senate Committee on
Epidemic Diseases emphasized Congress intended to create an eﬀective and uniform system of quarantine
regulations vigorously enforced at all ports, and to prevent the importation of ...diseases into one State
from another.115 The committee concluded that some states had insuﬃcient quarantine procedures at their
ports, and that this presented a serious danger to the health of the nation: [I]f a single gate is left open to the
introduction of such diseases the whole country may suﬀer the disastrous consequences of fatal epidemics.116
The truth of this statement was clear from previous experiences in which ships from infected ports had
entered the United States at smaller ports with less stringent quarantine restrictions.117 The only way to
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26prevent this, according to the report, was to create a thorough system of national quarantine.118
Naturally, some states resisted this encroachment on their power. The opposition was by no means widespread,
however; epidemics in previous years had convinced many states that they would rather have federal oﬃcers
deal with this intractable problem than have to handle it on their own. However, the committee report noted
that some state and local authorities strenuously objected to interference in their quarantine systems by fed-
eral authorities. Those who objected most strenuously tended to be those states with the most eﬀective and
sophisticated systems of quarantine – New York and New Orleans.119 Believing that they could implement
superior quarantine systems to that of the federal government, these ports conducted quarantine inspections
of their own in addition to federal inspections for decades to come.120 This activity was consistent with the
language of the bill, that it should be enforced in accordance with such rules and regulations of State and
municipal health authorities as may be made in pursuance of or consistent with this act.121
Congress used the Commerce Clause as the authority for federal quarantine intervention, arguing that the
powers in this bill are clearly justiﬁed as regulations of foreign and interstate commerce.122 As precedent for
this use of the Commerce Clause, the committee report cited appropriations made for the removal of snags,
bars, and other obstructions from the navigable waters of the country, and for a federal system of lighthouses
and lifesaving services.123 Since these powers also aimed to improve the safety of trade between the United
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27States and foreign nations, the committee concluded that the federal quarantine regulations fell under the
same authorization.124 The committee also emphasized that the statute did not require any action from
state authorities; state oﬃcers could choose whether or not to enforce the federal quarantine regulations. Of
course, in the event that they failed to enforce the federal regulations, the federal government would send it
own oﬃcers to do so. Nonetheless, the controversial element of compulsion of state oﬃcials was absent.125
The Supreme Court passed upon the validity of federal quarantine powers under the Commerce Clause
and the simultaneous power held by states to implement their own quarantines in Bartlett v. Lockwood in
1896. The Court held as unquestionable the authority of Congress to establish quarantine regulations and
to protect the country as respects its commerce from contagious and infectious diseases,126. It also, how-
ever, recognized that this federal power did not invalidate state laws relating to the same policy domain,
citing Congress’s decision in view of the diﬀerent requirements of diﬀerent climates and localities and of the
diﬃculty of framing general law upon the subject, ...to permit the several States to regulate the matter of
protecting the public health as to themselves seemed best.127 The Court thus seemed to view the federal
appropriation of a power which had traditionally belonged to the states as justiﬁed under the Commerce
Clause. Another case before the court in 1896 presented the more pointed question of whether state or
federal laws would prevail in the case of conﬂict, when the federal law was enacted under the authority of the
Commerce Clause and the state law enacted for the purpose of regulating health. In Hennington v. Georgia,
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:
If the inspection, quarantine, or health laws of a State, passed under its reserved power to
provide for the health, comfort, safety of its people, come into conﬂict with an act of Congress,
passed under its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, such local regulations,
to the extent of the conﬂict, must give way in order that the supreme law of the land—an act
of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution—may have unobstructed operation.128
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28This ruling left little question that Congress could enact quarantine laws and the Surgeon General could
enforce them even if those laws conﬂicted with state quarantine laws.
The 1893 Act had to avoid not only Constitutional and political pitfalls from the states’ rights side of the
issue, but also opposition from those who wanted a more comprehensive federal public health organization.
Many medical associations and health oﬃcials at the time supported the resurrection of the National Board
of Health, in a more potent form.129 The committee itself expressed sympathy with this goal, stating that a
national board of health (in the Treasury Department), composed of sanitary scientists, should be established
and maintained.130 The Senate Committee on Epidemic Diseases, however, presented the housing of this
power with the Marine Hospital Service as a necessary compromise since most in Congress would not support
the recreation of the National Board of Health. The importance of having some federal authority with the
power to implement a national uniform system of quarantine was too important to risk being tied to such a
controversial measure: These powers are ...not only important, but absolutely necessary to the security of
this country from the importation of contagious and infectious disease.131
The 1893 Act’s passage allowed the Surgeon General to establish a system of quarantine regulations and to
assemble and train a group of medical oﬃcers as experts in the control of epidemics. One of the ﬁrst successes
to result from this power came in response to a smallpox outbreak in Eagle Pass, Texas, in July of 1895.
The victims of the epidemic were a group of 300 African-American agricultural workers from Alabama and
Georgia who had contracted smallpox in Mexico, where they had been lured by the false promise of owning
land. The people of Eagle Pass responded to this group with hostility and avoidance, due to past experiences
129This support was widespread, including a national conference of State boards of health, [and] an organization of the
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130Committee on Epidemic Diseases Report to accompany S. 2707, granting additional quarantine powers and imposing
additional duties upon the Marine Hospital Service. January 4, 1893. 52d Congress, Second Session, Report No. 1144, pp. 3.
131Committee on Epidemic Diseases Report to accompany S. 2707, granting additional quarantine powers and imposing
additional duties upon the Marine Hospital Service. January 4, 1893. 52d Congress, Second Session, Report No. 1144, pp. 3.
29with epidemics introduced by migrating agricultural workers. State eﬀorts to deal with the outbreak were
inadequate; no one created a registry of the infected and there was no organized eﬀort to separate the sick
from the well. As some of the victims began to die, the lack of state control allowed the infected men to
leave the area out of fear that they would meet the same fate.132 Once the situation became known to
federal oﬃcials, Surgeon General Wyman assumed control of the situation by appointing Dr. Rosenau, a
MHS oﬃcer, and employing twenty guards to organize separate camps for the sick men and the apparently
well men. After this action was taken, no additional cases of smallpox occurred, and two-thirds of the 178
men who had already been infected survived the epidemic. 133
The new provisions for overseas medical inspections at foreign ports of departure appeared to confer beneﬁts
not only to the Americans they were designed to protect, but also for the foreigners traveling on those ships.
One anecdote about a cholera incident in 1893 illustrates this point. In the late summer of 1893, eight ships
departed from Naples, Italy; four were headed to New York and four to South American ports. At the time of
the ships’ departure, Naples had not been identiﬁed as a cholera-infected port, but the disease was conﬁrmed
at the port three days after they had set sail. Because of the new pre-departure inspection requirement, the
four ships destined for New York were inspected prior to departure, thoroughly cleaned, and their passengers
were vaccinated. Aboard the ships sailing to New York, three cases of cholera occurred, causing the ship to
be quarantined for ﬁve days (the incubation period of cholera) prior to docking. By contrast, the four ships
headed to South America had undergone no such inspection and subsequent cleaning, and four hundred and
ﬁfty-four of their passengers died en route.134
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30As had occurred in the past, as soon as the Marine Hospital Service gained increased quarantine powers,
it also found itself engaged in a turf war. In March of 1894, Surgeon General Wyman defended against an
attempt to shift federal quarantine power to a new bureau of public health and advisory council (comprised
of one representative from each state) to be housed in the Department of the Interior.135 The proposed
change would not remove the MHS’s responsibility for enforcing quarantine laws, but would take away the
agency’s rulemaking power. Though Wyman’s motivation to resist this move likely stemmed from his intense
loyalty to the MHS and a belief that it was the most able agency in dealing with national quarantine, the
arguments he (along with others) used to defeat this attempted change provide insight into the legal and
policy questions surrounding national quarantine at the time. Wyman’s most obvious argument was that the
MHS had the most experience in dealing with quarantine and inspection, and was therefore the best-suited
agency to wield this power.136
Wyman also argued that the MHS should retain national quarantine rulemaking power because there were
practical advantages to having both rulemaking and enforcement powers housed in the same agency:
In the proposed scheme of having one Department make the rules and another execute them.
I can readily see the possibilities of clash, the shifting of responsibility from one to the other,
and crimination and recrimination after the resultant disaster.... The proposed law would
make the Marine-Hospital Corps simply a hewer of wood and a drawer of water,137.
Separating the rulemaking power from the enforcement power would also undermine the eﬀectiveness of a
national quarantine body in the case of emergency. With the MHS holding both powers, argued Wyman, the
135May 18, 1894, Address of Dr. Walter Wyman, Supervising Surgeon General, U.S. Marine Hospital Service, In re a proposed
bill to establish a Bureau of Public Health in the Department of the Interior, etc. House Committee on Interest and Foreign
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31Surgeon General could implement new quarantine regulations as soon as the insuﬃciency of a local system
was identiﬁed. Wyman noted that the usual characteristics of epidemics required immediate implementation
of new regulations and that every epidemic is apt to produce new conditions and to demand some variation
in suppressive measures.138 Wyman argued that in a time of cholera threats from Europe, thwarting the
federal government’s ability to react quickly to changing circumstances would be obviously bad public health
policy.139
Wyman’s argument for maintaining the quarantine power in the Secretary of the Treasury rather than in the
Department of the Interior melded institutional competence with the constitutional basis for the quarantine
power. He argued that maritime quarantine related to commerce and was thus tied closely to shipping
laws, the customs service, and immigrant inspection, the regulations for which were all administered by
the Treasury Department. In this way, housing the quarantine power in the Department of the Interior
would lead to two heads of large departments of the Government attempting to manage subtle aﬀairs upon
a big ocean vessel arriving at an American seaport.140 Further, removing the quarantine power from the
Department of the Treasury would take it further away from its Constitutional roots in the power to regulate
commerce, generally the purview of the Treasury.141
Though Surgeon General Wyman succeeded in his struggle to retain control of federal quarantine powers in
1894, that struggle resurfaced repeatedly in the years that followed. One attempt in 1898 to increase the
quarantine power of the Marine Hospital Service was defeated by these eﬀorts. The proposed bill attempted
to remove the complementary relationship between federal and state and local quarantine laws in favor of a
supreme federal quarantine law that would make quarantine policies truly uniform across the states. Some
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32of the most virulent opponents to this measure were the health oﬃcers of the state of New York. New York
medical oﬃcer Dr. A.H. Doty particularly objected to the autocratic power the bill would give the Surgeon
General, and argued that the power to make quarantine regulations should be held by a panel of health
oﬃcers representing each state rather than by this one man.142 Doty’s institutional competence argument
had two prongs to it. First, he argued that the MHS was not well-suited to the task of acting as a health
department for the nation, stressing that it was created for the care of disabled seamen, and since that time
nothing has been changed of the management.143 Second, he argued that state health oﬃcers were better
able to make quarantine regulations because of their better understanding of the local variations in climatic
conditions and shipping.144
Doty did not argue for local control of quarantine, however, but only for state control, blaming the shotgun
quarantine ﬁascoes of the recent yellow fever epidemics on diﬀerences in local health oﬃcers rather than the
inadequate eﬀorts of state health oﬃcers.145 He later stated that the refusals by state and municipal health
oﬃcers to follow prudent federal quarantine regulations that had happened in the past would not occur in
the future: I do not think the present day, with the light we have in the science of disinfection and bacte-
riology, that there will be ever a State or municipal authority which will openly defy or decline to do work
properly.146 Doty dismissed the past refusals to take proper quarantine measures as the result of ultra-rapid
technological progress which outpaced the knowledge and beliefs of local medical oﬃcers, and predicted that
such a rapid advance would not take place again.147 This notion that the scientiﬁc knowledge of one’s own
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33day represents the ultimate state of enlightenment repeats itself throughout the history of American public
health.
Dr. H.B. Horlbeck, health oﬃcer at Charleston, South Carolina, argued against increased national gov-
ernment power on the that such a power would interfere with fundamental states’ rights. To Horlbeck,
state control of health matters was the very foundation stone of our civilization, embodying the duty of a
community to care for the health of its own people. It is not diﬃcult to see that any meddling with this
most classic of state police powers would prompt such a visceral reaction; the power to control quarantine
is, in essence, the ability to control the threats visited upon one’s own body. The proposed bill, according
to Dr. Joseph Y. Porter, State Health Oﬃcer of Florida, would remove from cities and states the ability to
protect themselves against disease as they saw ﬁt, and give the Marine-Hospital Service undue power: [I]s the
General Government preparing for the mustering and maintenance of an expensive local health police—an
army of sanitarians that, like the locusts in the ﬁeld, eat up our substance and usurp our liberties?148
Though arguments about federal overreaching sounded loudly, the need for a uniform quarantine system had
yet more support. The proposed compromise between the goals of respecting states’ rights and implementing
an eﬀective quarantine system, the national board of health consisting of representatives from each state,
was thought to be Constitutionally untenable. Because federal quarantine power found its source in the
Commerce Clause, it must be administered by a federal agency tasked with the regulation of commerce.149
It is diﬃcult to overestimate the federal government’s fear of stepping into a health regulatory role outside
that of that related to commerce. The Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce reminded a witness: You must remember this very diﬃculty: There are many gentlemen who insist
that the Government has no business at all in these matters outside of its control over interstate and foreign
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34commerce.150
If this possible constitutional problem did not eliminate the chances of the advisory board option, Surgeon
General Wyman argued convincingly against the appropriateness of a democratic body making quarantine
regulations, noting that political self-interest would lead to decisions contrary to the interests of both public
health and commerce: Would not some of the Northern States be beneﬁted commercially by an unnecessary
long detention of vessels arriving at these Southern ports?151 Further, Wyman argued that the desire of
states to operate their own quarantine systems was motivated more by proﬁt than by public health con-
cerns. State-imposed quarantine fees had resulted in millions of dollars in unnecessary losses to the trade in
commerce.152 Somewhat surprisingly, the Surgeon General enjoyed signiﬁcant support from many southern
health oﬃcers for greater federal control of the system. Representatives of the Southern Medical Association
and the State Boards of Health of Georgia and Mississippi testiﬁed solidly in support of strengthening the
Marine Hospital Service’s quarantine power.153 Despite this support, however, and a positive report out of
committee, the bill to increase quarantine powers within the MHS was defeated. The buﬀeting dissents from
the states’ rights defenders and from those who wished to reestablish a national board of health left the bill
just shy of its required votes.
States Rights at the Turn of the Century and the Bubonic Plague
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35The major legal issue involved in federal quarantine at the end of the nineteenth century was the increase in
federal power at the expense of state quarantine autonomy, prompted by a backdrop of yellow fever epidemics.
By the early twentieth century, concerns shifted toward allegations of discrimination against certain groups
of immigrants, with the backdrop of the threat of plague.154 An incident in January of 1900 foreshadowed the
predominance of plague imported from the Far East as a quarantine problem in the early 1900’s. The Nanyo
Maru, a Japanese steamship, sailed into Port Townsend, Washington on January 31, 1900, carrying with it
a rumor of illness. The one death which occurred during the standard time of detention at the quarantine
station was attributed to beriberi, but the federal quarantine oﬃcer who inspected the ship rejected this
diagnosis and forced a longer quarantine until a bacteriological examination of the deceased’s tissues could
conﬁrm or disprove the presence of another disease. The test results conﬁrmed the oﬃcer’s suspicion of
plague, and time revealed that seventeen of the ship’s passengers carried the disease. The quarantine oﬃcer
recalled his fear as he performed the autopsies of the three men on board who perished from the plague,
noting that rubber gloves were not among the resources allotted him.155
The incident on the Nanyo Maru must have seemed a warning to quarantine oﬃcers, and its portent was
borne out less than two months later when bubonic plague ﬁrst took hold on the North American continent.
On March 6, 1900, the body of a Chinese immigrant was found dead in San Francisco’s Chinatown. The
San Francisco Board of Health determined that the unfortunate man had died of plague and instituted a
quarantine of an area the size of twelve city blocks.156 The diagnosis of plague was rejected, however, by
154The beginning of the century also saw stepwise expansion of the purview of federal quarantine, annexing authority over the
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36city oﬃcials, and the Board of Health sought support in its diagnosis from the Marine Hospital Service.
Dr. Joseph Kinyoun came to San Francisco to examine the body, and determined that the disease proved
bacteriologically to be bubonic plague.157 Following this conﬁrmation, the MHS carried out quarantine
measures in San Francisco from March until June of 1900, including disinfection and fumigation of ships at
the city’s harbor and inspection of trains at its borders.158 Despite the conﬁrmed diagnosis, however, the
people of San Francisco strenuously protested the quarantine. Even the Governor of California denied the
presence of plague, and by June of 1900 state opposition led to an end of federal involvement for over six
months.159 Indeed, almost every newspaper in the city viliﬁed the City Board of Health, Dr. Kinyoun, and
San Francisco’s mayor for implementing the quarantine, one terming them the perpetrators of the greatest
crime that has ever been committed against the city.160
Though it is easy to understand why one might resist believing that one’s city was infested with plague, it
is more diﬃcult to understand why the protestors might have thought the Board of Health and MHS would
fabricate the disease. The roughly 20,000 Chinese-American residents of San Francisco clearly thought the
quarantine was motivated by the anti-Chinese sentiment present in the city at the time.161 In addition to
this group, however, the business community in and near Chinatown also objected to the quarantine and
diagnosis of plague on the grounds that it was bad for business. This mistrust of health oﬃcers seriously
hampered their eﬀorts to prevent the spread of plague for the rest of the year, resulting in 122 deaths.
Attempting to prove to San Franciscans that the presence of plague was real, the Surgeon General assembled
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37a special commission of prestigious university medical professors to investigate. Their ﬁndings, combined
with the increasingly undeniable reports of deaths from the disease, ﬁnally convinced all local physicians and
enabled city and federal health oﬃcers to take more eﬀective action. A year after plague was ﬁrst discovered
in San Francisco, the Governor of California, under pressure from state health oﬃcers and neighboring
states, ﬁnally requested that the federal government re-initiate comprehensive fumigation and sterilization
programs.162
The lesson of the plague of 1900 had been well-learned by the time of the next outbreak in San Francisco.
After the great earthquake of 1906, the upheaval of buildings led rats to scatter out into the city, carrying
plague with them. In the years since the last epidemic, the scientiﬁc community had concluded that rats
themselves were the source of the problem, and that human-to-human transfer of the disease was unlikely.163
Because of this discovery, public health oﬃcials’ ﬁrst response to the disease was to quarantine rats, rather
than people, and to conduct extensive sanitation and disinfection programs throughout the city.164 This
time, the people of San Francisco welcomed federal health oﬃcers into the city, and admitted the presence of
the disease when it was diagnosed. The federal health oﬃcer assigned to direct the disease-control eﬀorts, Dr.
Rupert Blue, became an icon rather than a villain: The name of Dr. Rupert Blue came to be a household
word that was regarded almost with reverence.165 Six months after the start of the 1907 outbreak, it ended
in a celebration among San Franciscans, their city health oﬃcers, and the federal health oﬃcers involved,
including a banquet held in the main streets of the city to emphasize that San Francisco was now so clean
that one could eat a meal in the street.166
Congress took action in response to the San Francisco plague ﬁasco of 1900, passing legislation which enabled
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38federal oﬃcers to enforce quarantines without deference to state health laws. The Act of March 3, 1901
amended the Act of February 15, 1893 by authorizing the Surgeon General to mark quarantine boundaries
and providing penalties for vessels that disregarded those boundaries.167 Further, after the outbreak of yellow
fever in New Orleans in 1905, Congress strengthened federal quarantine power in the Act of 1906. The Act
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to manage all quarantine stations created by the federal government
(nearly all quarantine stations at the time) and to choose and acquire new quarantine sites as he deemed
necessary.168 This law also enabled the federal government to assume control over those quarantine stations
which were voluntarily handed over by local authorities. Each state gradually found the local operation of
quarantine stations to be more trouble than it was worth, and by 1921 the federal government controlled
every quarantine station in the United States.169
Health Oﬃcer as Immigration Gatekeeper
The gradual increases during the late 19th and early 20th century in federal quarantine power as applied to
immigrants sometimes presented health oﬃcers with the power to implement political interests other than
167March 3, 1901, Chapter 836 – An Act to amend An Act granting additional quarantine powers and imposing additional
duties upon the Marine-Hospital Service, approved February 15, 1893, pp. 1086-1087.
168June 19, 1906, Chapter 3433 – An Act to further protect the public health and make more eﬀective the national quarantine.
S. 4250, pp. 299.
169History of Quarantine, from CDC web site: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/history.htm. The gradual trend away from
city and state control of quarantine stations toward federal control may have, in part, been encouraged by a ruling making
cities ﬁnancially liable for the costs of wrongful detention of ships. In Sumner v. Philadelphia, Judge McKennan ruled that
the city of Philadelphia must compensate a shipowner whose vessel had been detained upon wrongful suspicion of yellow fever.
Sumner v. Philadelphia (1873) 23 F. Cas. 392. The last port to turn over quarantine control to the Public Health Service
was New York, though even this port had been under federal control for limited periods and for limited purposes. In 1911, in
response to cholera-infected passengers arriving at the Port of New York from Italy, the Public Health and Marine Hospital
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39those of public health. One cannot deny some aspect of heroism embodied by the medical oﬃcers who put
themselves on the front lines of contagious diseases in the hopes of protecting their fellow citizens. The
self-image of Public Health Service170 and state health oﬃcers was that of the public health oﬃcer [who]
tries to block the roads by which disease reaches his people. He is a ’detective,’ a ’federal agent,’ employed
in the interest of national health.171 However, the goal of communicable disease prevention often seemed
to coincide with the goal of preventing immigration, forcing Public Health Service (PHS) physicians to try
to unravel these two aims, at to refuse to implement those regulations and rules that seemed more hostile
to the immigrants themselves than to their possible illnesses. One such law, passed by Congress in 1907,
empowered health oﬃcers to state on an immigrant’s medical certiﬁcate whether the immigrant had an illness
(non-communicable) or deformity which might render him or her likely to become a public charge.172 Not
willing to become mere tools of immigration policy, the health oﬃcers simply refused to make such entries,
reporting only on the signiﬁcant communicable diseases they detected.173
Neither were health oﬃcers particularly concerned with easing immigration, often oblivious to the feelings
of those they inspected. Alan Kraut, in his book Silent Menace, articulates this complex role:
These proud, uniformed agents of the United States government saw Ellis Island’s ornate
turrets as towers of vigilance from which they dutifully guarded their country against disease
and debility. Those were the enemies, not the immigrants themselves...Largely unaware
that immigrants found the Ellis Island inspection daunting, oﬃcials saw their task not as
one of making the process more humane but more eﬀective and evenhanded....They were
acutely aware of refusing to permit an ever-louder chorus of restrictionists from inﬂuencing
their medical diagnoses, even if those diagnoses were from time to time unconsciously shaped
by their own ethnic biases.174
170The Marine Hospital Service changed its name to the Public Health Service in 1912. Satcher, David, M.D., Ph.D. The
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40Even removing the pressures to use their medical inspection powers as a tool to prevent immigration, these
federal medical oﬃcers faced a more basic internal conﬂict between their roles as inspectors and their training
and professional duty as physicians. Necessarily, they could not treat every illness presented to them by the
many immigrants moving past them each day, and were forced to make complicated judgment calls each day,
navigating between their medical oath to minister unto the individual and their statutory responsibility to
guard the health of the public at large.175
The fact that immigrants who came through the Canadian border faced fewer obstacles than those from
other countries implied to some that the federal medical authorities’ ethnic biases inﬂuenced their medical
scrutiny.176 At the time, those most suspected of carrying contagious diseases were southern Europeans,
Russians, Asians, and Mexicans, while the immigrants who came through the Michigan border from Canada
were generally the less-suspect northern Europeans.177 Though this ethnic preference probably played some
role in the lenience of Canadian border inspections, legitimate policy reasons could explain the diﬀerence
as well. For instance, most immigrants coming in through Michigan had already been inspected when they
came by boat initially to American ports; as a result, the Michigan point of entry tended to be free of the
diseases that racked other American ports. The cooperation of Canadian health oﬃcers and similarities
between the Canadian and U.S. quarantine systems also helped create a perception that immigrants crossing
the Michigan border presented less of a threat. 178
The more typical medical inspection experience was that of the immigrants who entered through Ellis Island.
In 1911, a year of high immigration, Ellis Island physicians examined 749,642 immigrants. Of this total,
175Ibid., pp. 77.
176Reports of anti-Semitic comments and medical diagnosis made at the Port of Galveston, Texas further undermine the image
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Books: 1994, pp. 65.
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4116,910 were certiﬁed as having physical or mental defects; among these, 1,363 were rejected for having loath-
some or dangerous contagious diseases. The proportion of immigrants rejected for reasons of disease at Ellis
Island was representative of the rest of the country. During the peak immigration era from 1890 to 1924,
the proportion of immigrants rejected for health reasons never exceeded three percent, with an average of
less than one percent over the entire period.179 Because of the high numbers of immigrants passing through
inspection points during this period, the physicians had to perform their duties extremely quickly. The skills
developed in spotting disease during a person’s brief walk through the line, could be impressive. One PHS
physician who served as an inspector at Ellis Island recalled the diagnostic feats of his chief medical oﬃcer,
Dr. John Billings: A German lady was in the line and he took one look at her and said, Nehmen Sie die
Parucke Ab, meaning take oﬀ the wig, which we had not noticed, and were astounded to see a totally bald
lady who had had favus.180 Despite such examples of professional expertise, some medical oﬃcers conducted
themselves in less than respectable ways, taking money from immigrants in exchange for false naturalization
papers. When Theodore Roosevelt took oﬃce in 1901, he set about curbing corruption on Ellis Island by
appointing William Williams as Chief Medical Oﬃcer. Williams instituted an anti-corruption program of
sending in agents posing as immigrants to root out dishonest oﬃcers.181
Some of the diseases for which immigrants were excluded during that time, like favus, were far less menacing
than those which had ﬁgured prominently in American quarantine history.182 The most common disease
diagnosed at Ellis Island, by far, was trachoma, which accounted for 85.6 percent of the total diagnoses
of contagious diseases.183 Trachoma is a contagious disease of the eyelid which causes inﬂammation of the
179Kraut, Alan M. Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the Immigrant Menace. Basic Books: 1994, pp. 66.
180Parascandola, John, Doctors at the Gate: PHS at Ellis Island. Public Health Reports, January/February 1998. Volume
113, pp. 83, pp. 84. Favus is a chronic inﬂammatory dermatophytic infection, which is contagious and causes the loss of hair
and disﬁgurement of the scalp. eMedicine Journal, January 24 2002, Volume 3, Number 1.
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42conjunctiva and painful granulation of the eyelids. At the time, the disease could lead to scarring of the
cornea and subsequent blindness.184 Because physicians encountered the disease almost exclusively at Ellis
Island, they assumed that it was not indigenous, until it appeared in Minnesota among the Native American
population. Despite the knowledge that it was not imported, trachoma remained on the list of excludable
diseases for many years.185
The quarantine and immigration station at Angel Island, California caused considerable controversy over the
diseases for which it excluded immigrants. Angel Island, the West Coast Ellis Island, began to be used as an
immigration station in 1910.186 In its ﬁrst year of operation, the station saw the medical inspection of over
11,000 immigrants, and by 1920 reached a high of 25,000. The percentage of excluded immigrants at Angel
Island was far higher than at Ellis Island – between ten to ﬁfteen percent.187 The Chinese government and
the Chinese-American community believed that this high statistic was due largely to the unjust exclusion of
Asian immigrants with treatable diseases which were more prevalent among Asian immigrants.188
Based on the belief that the exclusion of immigrants with liver served as a mere pretext for the exclusion of
Asians, one Chinese immigrant appealed the decision to exclude him based on this diagnosis. Liang Buck
Chew was a Chinese citizen who had resided in the United States for several years before making a visit to
his family back home. Upon his return, medical inspectors excluded him based on a diagnosis of clonorchiasis
(also called ﬂuke worm of the liver), then considered a dangerous contagious disease.189 Chew brought suit
while being held for deportation. Chew argued that clonorchiasis is not a contagious disease within the
meaning of the statute, because it cannot be transmitted from person to person, but must pass through two
184Because of the ease of eﬀective treatment, and the relative diﬃculty of disease transmission, trachoma is no longer grounds
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43animal hosts before becoming a threat to man and is only acquired by eating undercooked ﬁsh. Because the
disease was unlikely to be transmitted from the infected person to others, argued Chew, it was not a rational
basis for exclusion.190
Though the Massachusetts district court agreed with Chew that there remains a good deal of doubt whether
clonorchiasis can reasonably be found to be a dangerous contagious disease in this country, it ruled in favor
of the federal government.191 Though the court declined to accept the government’s argument that medical
oﬃcer’s decisions were per se unreviewable, it gave broad deference to the reasonableness of those deter-
minations.192 Noting that the Surgeon General believed the necessary hosts for clonorchiasis to be present
in United States waters, he accepted the contention that the disease was transmissible as reasonable.193
Because of the several host steps that must be encountered in order to transmit the disease, however, the
question still remained as to whether the disease was contagious. In answering this question, the opinion set
a standard for great deference to the judgment of PHS oﬃcers:
The statute in question, having been passed for the protection of the public health,
should receive a liberal interpretation in aid of its obvious purpose. The underlying intention
of it is to establish safeguards against the introduction into this country by alien immigrants
of dangerous diseases, which might spread and do harm here. Certain diseases of which this
would be true – e.g. yellow fever – are not contagious in the strict sense of the word. But
they must be within the intended scope of the act.194
The court’s concern that a narrow deﬁnition of contagious would disable the Surgeon General’s authority
over the control of yellow fever is clear, and that disease was still fresh in the American memory at the
time of the case. After this ruling, clonorchiasis remained an excludable disease until 1927, when a Chinese-
American physician, Dr. Fred Lam, persuaded the Surgeon General that the disease did not threaten the
190Ibid., pp. 183-184.
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44United States.195
The broad deference given to PHS oﬃcers in deciding on medical exclusions did not shrink in the following
years. In 1938, the Southern District of New York granted almost absolute deference to a PHS oﬃcer’s
decision to exclude a temporary visitor from Europe on the grounds that she was infected with ringworm of
the toenails.196 The court did not reject the petitioner’s argument that ringworm of the nails was comparable
to the condition called ’athlete’s foot’ and was therefore not properly within the deﬁnition of a dangerous
or loathsome disease. Nonetheless, it upheld the medical oﬃcer’s decision, showing complete deference
to the Surgeon General’s judgment in deciding which diseases would suﬃce to exclude an immigrant.197
In United States ex re. Siegel v. Shinnick, a 1963 case involving the quarantine detention of a visitor from
Sweden, the Eastern District of New York reaﬃrmed this deference yet again. In this case, a PHS oﬃcer
detained the Swedish traveler on the basis of a World Health Organization declaration that Stockholm (where
the detainee had visited prior to her arrival in the United States) was infected with smallpox.198 Because
Mrs. Siegel did not present a valid certiﬁcate of vaccination of smallpox, the medical oﬃcer detained her
at the PHS hospital at Stapleton, Staten Island for the fourteen day period of incubation.199 Mrs. Siegel’s
daughter argued that she had only been in Stockholm from July 21 through 25, while the last case of smallpox
in Stockholm had occurred on June 22. Nonetheless, the court concluded:
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the immigration oﬃcials where the medical certiﬁcate on arrival shows that the alien is aﬄicted with a loathsome or dangerous
contagious disease. United States ex re. Frumcair v. Reimer, 25 F. Supp. 552, 554.
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45It is idle and dangerous to suggest that private judgment or judicial ipse dixit can, acting
on the one datum of the date June 22 as the last identiﬁed and reported case, undertake to
supercede the continuing declaration of the interested territorial health administration that
Stockholm is still a small pox infected local area.200
Despite the lack of evidence showing that Mrs. Siegel had been exposed to smallpox, the court deferred to
the PHS oﬃcer’s judgment that the risk of her exposure was signiﬁcant, and held that the decision to detain
her was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.201
After the end of World War I in 1918, the inﬂux of passengers from Europe increased dramatically and
presented a new level of medical danger. In response to disastrous epidemics of typhus in parts of Europe, the
PHS stationed oﬃcers at European ports to oversee disease-control measures there. At the time, shipowners
were required to establish sanitation and disinfection facilities, with PHS oﬃcers monitoring their procedures.
When, as happened from time to time, European governments interfered with or prevented the United
States’ medical oﬃcers from performing their duties, the United States responded by detaining the oﬀending
country’s ships at our quarantine stations for the entire incubation period of the suspected disease, and
passed that signiﬁcant cost on to the foreign shipowners. The United States government only had to take
this action a few times before foreign governments agreed to comply with PHS inspections at their ports.
In the end, the eﬀort was successful; typhus never made it past these inspection points into the United
States.202
The inﬂux of travelers and immigrants from Europe in the post-WWI period led to the construction and
expansion of new quarantine and inspection stations. The station at Leading Point, in Baltimore, Maryland,
was typical of the smaller stations created at that time. Like the medical oﬃcers working at stations at
Ellis Island and Angel Island, the medical oﬃcers of these smaller stations lived at their quarantine stations.
Unlike those at the larger stations, however, they inspected a less diverse and smaller set of passengers,
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46allowing them to use the stations for domestic quarantine purposes as well.203 At the Baltimore station, in
fact, the majority of quarantine patients were local residents who had been diagnosed with smallpox.204
During this period, the Surgeon General instituted two other policy changes regarding the inspection of
incoming ships and their passengers. First, the government promulgated a list of dangerous contagious
diseases which, if present at a ship’s port of origin or on the ship itself, would require great scrutiny by
quarantine inspectors. If one of the diseases was present on board, all passengers were detained at the
quarantine hospital and the ship was disinfected and fumigated while ﬂying the yellow ﬂag which symbolized
quarantine. The dangerous contagious diseases listed during this time included: yellow fever, smallpox,
plague, cholera, leprosy, anthrax, and typhus.205
The other major policy change which took place during this time commenced in 1924, when Congress
provided for a system of overseas medical inspection of immigrants prior to their departure for the United
States. The Act of 1924 required that each immigrant obtain a statement from a local physician testifying to
his or her health.206 The measure attempted to prevent situations in which immigrants made the costly and
somewhat hazardous trip to the United States only to ﬁnd out that they would be forced to return for medical
reasons.207 The validity of these statements, however, proved unreliable, and Surgeon General Cumming
203In an typical year, medical oﬃcers at the Baltimore station inspected about 700 ships, over 29,000 persons,
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47soon recommended a diﬀerent approach. In 1925, the United States government began performing medical
examinations of prospective immigrants abroad, ﬁrst experimenting with a pilot program in Britain, and
then expanding the service to all major foreign ports. Though a clean bill of health at the port of departure
did not guarantee an immigrant’s entry into the United States, it did make the immigration process more
humane.208
Resource Struggles and the Advent of Air Travel
The increased quarantine and inspection duties which resulted from the increased volume of immigrants
and travelers strained the PHS’s lagging resources. In the mid- to late-1920’s, the PHS consisted of about
180 commissioned oﬃcers, including those employed in emergencies and those assigned at ports overseas;
those assigned to ports in Europe alone comprised sixteen percent of the regular commissioned corps.209
Considering these numbers, one recognizes that each outbreak of disease imposed a serious strain on the
agency’s capacities. For instance, when the 1927 ﬂood in the Mississippi Valley required twenty PHS oﬃcers
to provide disaster relief medical services, that occupied over thirteen percent of all PHS medical oﬃcers
stationed in the United States. In partial response to this strain on resources, the PHS began to allow
radio pratique on a limited basis in 1937. Radio pratique is the process by which a quarantine station
issued permission to enter a port without inspection, based on the belief that the vessel posed little threat
of disease. The policy in the late 1930’s at the Port of New York (the ﬁrst port at which radio pratique was
208Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
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48implemented) allowed radio pratique for only those ships which carried a certiﬁed physician on board.210
This practice gradually expanded throughout the following decades, as resources remained small relative to
the agency’s responsibilities. One PHS historian notes that the new responsibilities in the 1920’s and 1930’s
spread the commissioned corps so thin as to almost reach the breaking point.211
The advent of air travel in the post-WWI years led to the Air Commerce Act of 1926.212 The statute
authorized the Public Health Service to quarantine and inspect passengers arriving in the United States via
air, and designated the ﬁrst airport of entry as Meachem Field at Key West, Florida. Soon after the advent
of quarantine and inspection at Key West in December of 1927, the Public Health Service commenced similar
operations at airports in New York City, Tampa, and Miami. The rapid increase in air travel was tremendous
over the following years, with 5,384 aircraft inspections in 1930 growing to 47,113 by 1949.213 During this
era, a PHS oﬃcer (though not necessarily an actual physician214) inspected each international airplane
arriving in the United States and examined the passengers for indications of quarantinable diseases. The
airports then directed disembarking international passengers into a separate arriving area, so that if disease
were discovered in one of the passengers or if a disease vector were discovered on the airplane, it would not
infect others in the airport. In addition, airports contained small quarantine facilities in the inspection area
to accommodate those whom quarantine inspectors suspected to be infected with a dangerous contagious
disease.215
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49Medical inspectors were not only concerned about the prospect of diseased passengers, but also by the
possibility that disease-carrying insects might also travel on international ﬂights. The old concerns of yellow
fever rose again, particularly after the variety of mosquito which carried the disease were found on board
airplanes coming from the tropics in 1931.216 Because of the yellow fever threat, as well as new varieties of
insects introduced into the United States by air travel, the Public Health Service implemented an insecticide
program for international aircraft in the 1930s.217 The policy included spraying aircraft with insecticides,
as well as PHS surveys of mosquitoes around air and sea ports in order to determine the risk of mosquito
transportation from various areas.218
The end of World War I also brought into focus a public health problem which had not previously been
addressed by federal authorities. The most common medical diagnosis made at many quarantine hospitals
during the post-war years was of sexually transmitted disease.219 Because of the prevalence of venereal
diseases contracted during the war, federal and state governments used quarantine laws to detain prostitutes
who worked near military bases (for longer periods than criminal statutes prohibiting prostitution would
otherwise allow). Strikingly, no actual diagnosis of a venereal disease was required as a prerequisite for
detention. Rather, a reasonable belief that a woman was a prostitute suﬃced as grounds for quarantine
detention, eﬀectively lengthening the sentences for prostitution without trial.220 After the end of World
War I, Surgeon General Parran continued to promote federal eﬀorts to curb the spread of venereal diseases,
creating a Division of Venereal Diseases within the Public Health Service and beginning an educational
campaign. This led to the National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938, which provided funding for
research and education about venereal diseases.
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50This moment in the late-1930’s saw the ﬁrst instance of decentralization in contagious disease control in the
United States. The Venereal Disease Control Act attempted to achieve its goals not through federal action,
but through signiﬁcant grants to the states.221 This measure came close on the heels of the Social Security
Act of 1935, which had authorized health grants to the states on the principle that the most eﬀective way
to prevent the interstate spread of disease is to improve state and local public health programs. With this
legislation, the PHS became adviser and practical assistant to state and local health services.222 Though
this change met with little fanfare, it began a transfer of disease control powers from the federal government
to state governments that has been occurring, with few exceptions, ever since.
Boundaries to PHS Quarantine Power:Quarantine Powers of the Department of Agriculture
The tremendous power given to the Surgeon General (through the Secretary of the Treasury) under the quar-
antine and immigration regulations seems to leave little need for other quarantine and inspection powers.
The prevalence of contagious diseases brought in by plants and animals, however, posed a serious problem
to American farmers by the early twentieth century. Inspection of plants and animals was clearly not a
physician’s area of expertise, and required the involvement of other agencies. The regulations promulgated
under the powers of the Department of Agriculture over the years have kept the Public Health Service’s
quarantine powers bounded to the control of human diseases and some animal diseases that can be trans-
mitted to humans.
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51The Plant Quarantine Act of August 20, 1912 authorized the Department of Agriculture to establish and
maintain quarantine districts for plant diseases and insect pests; to permit and regulate the movement of
fruits, plants, and vegetables therefrom... 223 The statute prohibited the importation or acceptance of nurs-
ery stock in contradiction with the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture for this purpose. The
regulations the Secretary was empowered to promulgate included:
1.
The requirement of a permit.
2.
The requirement of a certiﬁcate of inspection and of a certain inspection procedure performed by the country or state from which the nursery stock is imported.
3.
The requirement that the nursery stock be grown only under quarantine conditions or another form of supervision.
4.
Any remedial measures the Secretary deems necessary to prevent the spread of plant pests, insects, or diseases.224
The statute also authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to forbid the importation of any category of plants,
fruits, vegetables, roots, bulbs, seeds, or other plant products as he deemed it necessary to prevent the
introduction of any tree, plant, or fruit disease or of any injurious insect, new to or not theretofore widely
prevalent or distributed within and throughout the United States,225.
At the time the statute was enacted, these regulations were enforced by a combination of agents of the
223The Plant Quarantine Act, Act of August 20, 1912 (as amended through Public Law 106-170, Dec. 17, 1999), pp. 1.
225The Plant Quarantine Act, Act of August 20, 1912 (as amended through Public Law 106-170, Dec. 17, 1999), Section 7,
pp. 1-2.
52Department of Agriculture and the customs agents of the Department of the Treasury.226 It imbued agents
of the Department of Agriculture with an inspection power similar to that held by PHS oﬃcers:
[A]ny employee of the Department of Agriculture...who has probable cause to believe that
any person coming into the United States, or any vehicle, receptacle, boat, ship, or vessel,
coming from any country or countries or moving interstate, possesses, carries, or contains
any nursery stock, plants, plant products, or other articles the entry or movement of which
in interstate or foreign commerce is prohibited or restricted by the provisions of this act,
...shall have the power to stop and, without warrant, to inspect, search, and examine such
person... 227
This power is written as broadly as that of the Quarantine Act of 1878, leaving three barriers to entry into
the United States: the customs oﬃcer, the medical oﬃcer, and the agricultural oﬃcer.228
The other side of the Department of Agriculture’s quarantine and inspection power deals with animals and
meat, rather than plants. The Cattle Contagious Diseases Act of 1905 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
to quarantine any area or state if he determined that any cattle in that area were infected with any contagious
disease.229 Soon after the passage of the 1905 Act, a federal court upheld the Secretary’s power to regulate
the shipment of cattle into the United States against constitutional challenge.230 Though the power to
regulate cattle in interstate spread of disease was also upheld231, the Supreme Court did strike the Secretary
of the Agriculture’s attempt to regulate intrastate commerce in diseased cattle.232 The Supreme Court later
226Ibid., Section 7, pp. 1-2.
228The Plant Quarantine Act has been used for purposes as broad as a plant quarantine of the entire state of Hawaii. In the
case U.S. v. Schafer, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision to prohibit the
transportation of plants from Hawaii without prior inspection, and to require inspection of all baggage and other personal eﬀects
of passengers...of...aircraft moving from Hawaii...to ascertain if they contain any of the articles or plant pests prohibited
movement by the quarantine.... U.S. v. Schafer (1972) 461 F. 2d 856, 857.
22921 USCS Sec.123. Title 21. Food and Drugs, Chapter 4. Animals, Meats, and Meat and Dairy Products, Prevention of
Introduction and Spread of Contagion,. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1496, 33 Stat. 1264, entitled An Act to enable the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish and maintain quarantine districts, to permit and regulate the movement of cattle and other live
stock therefrom, and for other purposes.
In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the federal government was not liable for damages to animals
which resulted from the forced exposure of healthy animals to diseased animals within the quarantine area. Rey v. United States
(1973) 484 F. 2d 45, 48.
230The Secretary of Agriculture has the power to determine in each epidemic whether shipments can be made consistently
with public safety at all and, if so, upon what conditions. United States v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (1910) 176 F 942.
231Congress has the power to enforce a quarantine to prevent the spread of diseases among livestock involved in interstate
commerce. Whipp v. United States (1931) 47 F 2d 496.
232Illinois C.R. Co. v. McKendree (1906) 203 US 514.
53distinguished this decision, allowing the Department of Agriculture to regulate intrastate quarantine and
disinfection of cattle if for the purpose of preventing the interstate spread of disease.233 This power included
the power to destroy infected cattle, but with a limited requirement of compensation.234 Because cattle were
by far the greatest concern, it was not until 1962 that Congress expanded the statute to cover any animals.235
Though this power was not oﬃcially granted until 1962, the Secretary of Agriculture had successfully used
the statute prior to that year to regulate other animals, particularly poultry.236
It is important to note that not all disease-related regulations on animals and plants were implemented by
the Department of Agriculture. Those animals and plants that carried diseases which could be transmitted
to humans were also under the purview of the Public Health Service’s contagious disease control powers.
One such measure, regulating the importation of psittacine birds, was enacted in 1930 in response to a
1929 outbreak of 170 cases psittacosis, 33 of which were fatal.237 By executive order, the Surgeon General
absolutely prohibited the importation of psittacine birds (i.e. birds in the parrot family) from any foreign
port in February of 1930.238 Under pressure from the pet dealers lobby, the PHS softened this regulation in
233It is ﬁnally urged against this conviction that the statute ...is unconstitutional in that Congress had no power to make it a
duty of a federal employee to dip cattle and suppress disease among cattle within a State;...that such legislation by Congress can
not be sustained as a regulation of interstate commerce, because it is not conﬁned to interstate commerce and the cattle treated
were not in interstate commerce. It is very evident from the Act of 1884 and the subsequent legislation and the regulations
issued under them that everything authorized to be done was expressly intended to prevent the spread of disease from one State
to another by contagion, which of course means by the passage of diseased cattle from one state to another. This is interstate
commerce. Thornton et al. v. United States (1926) 271 U.S. 414, 424.
234A dairy farmer whose cattle were destroyed following the discovery by the Department of Agriculture that some were
infected with tuberculosis was entitled to compensation in the amount prescribed by regulations promulgated under 21 USC
114(a) as opposed to fair market value prescribed by 21 USC 134(a) where Secretary of Agriculture did not declare national
emergency as contemplated by 21 USC 134(a)(b), and where cattle were not moving interstate or into the United States.
Loftin v. United States (1984) 785 F. 2d 1117.
235Act of July 2, 1962. 21 USCS Sec. 134a, Title 21, Ch. 4: Prevention of Introduction and Spread of Contagion, July 2,
1962.
236Must Hatch Incubator Co., v. Patterson (1928) 27 F 2d 447. The Department of Agriculture’s power to destroy animals
who were infected with or exposed to communicable disease of poultry. Slocum v. United States (1975) 515 F. 2d 237.
In 1979, the Department of Agriculture prohibited the interstate transport of swine with pseudorabies virus, and indirectly
regulated intrastate quarantine and inspection of swine by severely restricting the interstate commerce in swine if the state did
not implement a quarantine system that met federal standards. 9 C.F.R. 85.7
237Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 99.
238Executive Order No. 5264, January 24, 1930. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D.,
The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public
Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 99.
54October 1930, replacing the prohibition with a set of sanitary restrictions and a requirement of certiﬁcation.
Still, all imports were required to spend a mandatory two-week observation period in a federal quarantine
facility.239 In 1933, regulations regarding psittacine birds were expanded to cover interstate transport. The
federal government cooperated with state health oﬃcers in this eﬀort, notifying the state authorities as each
shipment was released from its two-week federal quarantine. The regulations appeared successful, as rates
of psittacosis decreased after their implementation.240
World War II, Malaria, and the PHS Act
The outbreak of World War II impacted the Public Health Service in many of the same fundamental ways
that it aﬀected the rest of American society. In the physician’s most traditional wartime role, medical
oﬃcers served overseas providing medical care to soldiers. At the same time, however, PHS oﬃcers were
tasked with some additional contagious disease control measures necessitated by the war. In 1940, the War
Department asked PHS medical oﬃcers to implement public health systems near military camps in the United
States, which soon included a malaria control program throughout the southeast and the territories.241 This
239Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 99.
240Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 100. The psittacine bird regulation led to a va-
riety of litigation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Duke, Ballard, and Buono v. United States (1958) 255 F. 2d
721, ruled on the contention of psittacine bird smugglers that they should be subject only to the penalty under the PHS
Act for violating quarantine laws, rather than the harsher penalty under the federal smuggling statute. The defendants
claimed that the Public Health Service regulation preempted the smuggling statute as applied to this case. In rejecting
this claim, Judge Fee ruled that these contentions have no validity. Appellants may have committed two crimes, one a
misdemeanor and the other a felony....If there is any conﬂict between the statute and the regulation, the former prevails.
Cliﬀord L. Duke, Jr., Louis Glenn Ballard and Vic Buono, v. United States of America, 255 F. 2d 721; January 7, 1958. (U.S.
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit), pp. 723-724.
241Parascandola, John, From MCWA to CDC – origins of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Malaria Control in
55necessity, combined with the shortage of physicians due to the war, led the PHS to employ non-physicians
as quarantine inspectors for the ﬁrst time.242 The PHS’s eﬀorts during this time were spurred by public and
media concern about the risk of epidemics of strange and exotic diseases which might be carried by soldiers
coming home from tropical locations.243
The Surgeon General created a new division of the Public Health Service to deal with malaria, called Malaria
Control in War Areas (MCWA). Because its domestic eﬀorts were concentrated mostly in the South, the
MCWA’s headquarters were located in Atlanta, where it has evolved to become the present-day Centers for
Disease Control.244 The primary method of malaria control during World War II involved the spraying of
insecticides: ﬁrst Paris Green, then diesel oil, and ﬁnally DDT. The DDT spraying eﬀorts were so successful,
and the threat of malaria so widespread, that Congress appropriated funding for spraying in areas besides
the military locations previously covered. Most residents had no fear of the chemical, and houses were
sprayed with a formulation of DDT that adhered to the walls, furniture, and other surfaces and retained its
insecticidal property against mosquitoes for long periods.245 The prevalent view of DDT at the time clearly
predated our current concerns about the carcinogenic properties of pesticides; all that was known at the
time was that DDT was a miracle insecticide, and incredibly eﬀective at preventing malaria.246
This expanded role of the Public Health Service, as well as heightened visibility during the war, led to the
most important legal moment in the Public Health Service’s twentieth century history – the passage of the
Public Health Service Act of 1944. The Act itself actually created little new law; rather it consolidated
War Areas. Public Health Reports, No. 6 Vol. 111, November 21, 1996. pp. 549.
242Each quarantine station still had a Medical Oﬃcer in Charge, who could be called in to conﬁrm the opinion of the inspector
in questionable or threatening cases. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950.
Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 93.
243Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 95.
244The MCWA had typhus added to is purview in 1944, and the agency was gradually granted authority over the control of
yellow fever, amoebic dysentery, diarrheal disease, polio, venereal disease, and tuberculosis by 1960. Parascandola, John, From
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56the provisions of the 1878 Act and the multiple statutes passed for similar purposes in the ensuing sixty-
six years. Because so little of the Act actually presented new law, and because of the public support
for the malaria control and other PHS eﬀorts which transpired during the War, the bill was almost entirely
uncontroversial.247 The report on the bill by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce cited
the importance of clarifying the sometimes unclear and even contradictory hodge-podge of laws authorizing
federal health activity:
Passed at diﬀerent times, these provisions of law have generally neither expressly repealed nor
expressly amended their predecessors, but have simply superimposed new duties and author-
ities on those already existing....[T]hey have led to serious inconsistencies and ambiguities,
as well as to gaps and duplications in substantive authority... 248
According to Surgeon General Parran, the areas of public health law most in need of codiﬁcation were the
provisions which addressed quarantine and inspection.249
The Section of the PHS Act which deals directly with quarantine and inspection laws is Section 361. Because
most of the section simply organizes and reasserts earlier laws, this description of the statute will limit itself
to the central provisions and any changes from past laws. The crux of the powers conferred by the Act of 1893
were embodied in Section 361(a), which authorizes the Surgeon General to make and enforce such regulations
as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases
from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State
or possession.250 In a hearing of the subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,
247Indeed, no witness at the hearing before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee opposed the bill’s passage. April
20, 1944, Report [to accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and Revision of Laws Relating to the Public Health Service, by
Mr. Bulwinkle, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives,
Report No. 1364, pp. 2.
249March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 138.
250Section (a) also provides: For the purposes of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General may provide
for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and other measures as in his judgment may be
necessary. March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign
57Congressman Willcox led Surgeon General Parran through a description of the changes to previous law
inherent in the section. One of these changes added to the interstate and foreign quarantine power the
ability to destroy contaminated or infected objects or animals.251 The most signiﬁcant change in Section
361(a), however, was to remove an obstacle to the Surgeon General’s power to regulate quarantine and
inspections. The previous law had conditioned that regulatory power on the nonexistence or inadequacy
of state and local regulations, while also requiring that the federal regulations be uniform. Section 361(a)
eliminated this condition, for the reasons articulated by Congressman Willcox:
The States ...have wholly withdrawn from the ﬁeld of foreign quarantine regulation. So far as
this part of the authority is concerned, the conditions upon the exercise of Federal authority
which may have been appropriate in 1893 seem no longer to have any function. In the ﬁeld
of interstate quarantine...Federal regulation has been conﬁned to matters pertaining to the
interstate movement of people or things over which the States have both constitutional and
practical diﬃculties in achieving eﬀective control.252
This change allows the Surgeon General to promulgate regulations regardless of whether a state or locality
had also enacted regulations.
Sections 361(b) and (c) clarify the detention and apprehension powers involved in medical inspections of
people coming from other countries.253 This aspect of the law remained mostly unchanged, with the exception
of a provision for conditional release of detainees. Prior to passage of the 1944 PHS Act, persons suspected
Commerce, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the
Public Health Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 16.
251Destruction of infected animals or contaminated articles would be permitted as a part of interstate or foreign quarantine
procedures, where such animals or articles are likely to infect human beings with a dangerous disease and no disposition other
than destruction can safely be made. April 20, 1944, Report [to accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and Revision of Laws
Relating to the Public Health Service, by Mr. Bulwinkle, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th
Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 1364, pp. 3-4.
253(b) Regulations prescribed under this section shall not provide for the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of
individuals except for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of such communicable diseases as
may be speciﬁed from time to time in Executive orders of the President upon the recommendation of the National Advisory
Health Council and the Surgeon General.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), regulations prescribed under this section, insofar as they provide for the apprehension,
detention, examination, or conditional release of individuals, shall be applicable only to individuals coming into a State or
possession from a foreign country, the Territory of Hawaii, or a possession. March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before
a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session,
on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 16.
58of having dangerous communicable diseases were detained at the point of entry, but the question of whether
they might be released on certain conditions had been unresolved. Subsections (b) and (c) provide for the
release of detainees on the condition of meeting requirements that ensured that the suspected disease would
not spread, for example, regular reporting to a health authority. This provision was needed in order to deal
with the increased level of travel by air, which introduced the heightened likelihood that travelers would
contract a disease in their home country, pass through quarantine without showing symptoms of the disease,
and develop symptoms soon after.254 The Act speciﬁed that the set of diseases for which a person could be
detained or conditionally released would be listed by Executive Order of the President.255
Section 361(d) provides for similar detention powers, but as related to interstate quarantine, rather than
foreign quarantine powers. Under this subsection, federal health oﬃcers were authorized to examine and
detain any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease...and (1) to be moving
or about to move from a State to another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infection to individuals
who...will be moving from a State to another State.256 Like the examination and detention provisions under
subsection (b), this power is authorized only in regard to the list of communicable diseases set by Executive
Order.257 Though the legislative history indicates that this action was already available to federal health
254March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 139-140.
255March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 16.
256The full language of the subsection reads as follows: On recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council, regu-
lations prescribed under this section may provide for the apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed
to be infected with a communicable disease in a communicable stage and (1) to be moving or about to move from a State to
another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infection to individuals who, while infected with such disease in a communi-
cable stage, will be moving from a State to another State. Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any such
individual is found to be infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary. March
1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of
Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health Service,
and for Other Purposes, pp. 16.
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House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 140.
59authorities, the provision clariﬁed a power doubted by some.258 The drafters of subsection (d)(2) intended
it to apply primarily to prostitutes with venereal diseases who were likely to pass their diseases to people
who would then cross state lines to infect others.259 Persons detained under this provision, as well as those
detained under the foreign quarantine provision, were entitled under the statute to medical treatment by
the Public Health Service.260
Though Section 361 deals most directly with quarantine and inspection, other provisions of the PHS Act
complement the powers and duties provided for in that section. For instance, the Act continued the Public
Health Service’s control over all quarantine stations261 and required each vessel to present a bill of health
at its point of entry into the United States.262 Section 311 formalized the cooperative relationship between
state and federal health authorities, directing the Surgeon General to accept voluntary assistance from state
and local governments, and to aid state and local governments with the enforcement of their quarantine and
health regulations.263 Section 325 addresses the Public Health Service’s role in medical examination of aliens,
directing the Surgeon General to provide for making such physical and mental examinations of arriving aliens
as are required by the immigration laws, subject to administrative regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General and medical regulations prescribed by the Surgeon General,264. Section 362 complements Section 325
by authorizing the Surgeon General to prohibit the introduction of persons and property from such countries
or places as he shall designate, when there exists a serious danger of introduction of a communicable disease
258Ibid., pp. 140. See 42 U.S.C. 92 and 42 U.S.C. 25.
259March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 141.
260This is decreed under Section 322(c) of the Act. April 20, 1944, Report [to accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and
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Commerce, 78th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 1364, pp. 3-4.
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60being transmitted from a certain country or other location.265
Other sections of the PHS Act create powers that had not been formalized previously. Section 363 confers
upon the Surgeon General special powers during times of war, in order to protect those in the armed services
from communicable diseases. The section authorizes the Surgeon General to apprehend and examine:
any individual reasonably believed (1) to be infected with such disease in a communicable
stage and (2) to be a probable source of infection to members of the armed forces of the
United States....if upon examination any such individual is found to be so infected, he may
be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary.266
This provision diﬀers fundamentally from the similar provision in Section 363ﬁnding its Constitutional basis
not in the protection of interstate commerce, but in the protection of members of the armed forces.267
This section’s Congressional supporters seemed to believe that the Surgeon General already possessed this
authority, but were advised by the Attorney General against attempting to assert it without a clearer
legislative basis than now exists. Though the inclusion of this section was actually prompted by the threat
of venereal diseases, its language is broad enough to encompass emergencies that might arise with regard to
other diseases as well.268
The Act also formally updated the federal quarantine power by expanding it oﬃcially to aircraft. Section 367
authorized the Surgeon General to command all quarantine and inspection activity for civil aircraft, holding
265The language of the section is carefully structured, and reads as followed: Sec. 362. Whenever the Surgeon General
determines that by reason of the existence of any communicable disease in a foreign country there is serious danger of the
introduction of such disease into the United States and that this danger is so increased by the introduction of persons or
property from such country that a suspension of the right to introduce such persons and property is required in the interest
of the public health, the Surgeon General, in accordance with regulations approved by the President, shall have the power to
prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall designate in
order to avert such danger, and for such period of time as he may deem necessary for such purpose. March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and
14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives,
78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health Service, and for Other
Purposes, pp. 16.
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61the same powers over this mode of transportation as he had exercised over seagoing vessels. Surgeon General
Thomas Parran testiﬁed in support of this new measure, arguing that the revolution in travel brought about
by airplane has necessitated the revolution of our methods of control and our defense against disease. All
of the implications of that statement I cannot see even at this time.269 Perhaps because of the unknowable
implications of air travel, this section of the Act is written extremely broadly, without speciﬁc references to
methods or processes of inspection.270 It does, however, refer to the powers under Sections 364-367, which
authorize the Surgeon General to create and direct quarantine stations, authorize the use of customs and
Coast Guard oﬃcers to enforce quarantine regulations, and require bills of health. The extent and manner
in which these powers would be used, however, would be at the discretion of the Surgeon General.271
One provision which was discussed heavily as an amendment to the PHS Act would provide for the control
and prevention of the spread of tuberculosis, a disease which posed a signiﬁcant threat at the time, and
continues to vex us today. The proposed amendment would require:
1.
The mass chest X-ray examination of the entire adult population of the United States, in order that all infectious persons may be quickly identiﬁed and isolated, in sanatoria or other appropriate facilities, as long as they remain capable of spreading the disease to others.
2.
269Ibid., pp. 45.
270Section 367. The Surgeon General is authorized to provide by regulation for the application to civil air navigation and civil
aircraft of any of the provisions of sections 364, 365, and 366 and regulations prescribed thereunder (including penalties and
forfeitures for violations thereof), to such extent and upon such conditions as he deems necessary for the safeguarding of the
public health. March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the
Public Health Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 18.
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Service, by Mr. Bulwinkle, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Congress, 2d Session, House of
Representatives, Report No. 1364, pp. 26.
62Adequate medical care, preferably in hospitals, for the known cases of tuberculosis which are active but not infectious...
3.
Whenever new cases are found, vigorous eﬀorts must be made to examine all family contacts and to bring those with newly discovered disease more promptly under medical care and isolation.
4.
Every source of public assistance should be made available for the vulnerable groups—those exposed to tuberculosis but not yet suﬀering from the disease.272
The primary policy goal of this bill was to increase funding for x-ray screenings for tuberculosis, in order
to identify those who were infected but not yet symptomatic.273 The report by the House Committee
on Education and Labor emphasized the importance of this measure, noting that developments in x-ray
technology [made] it possible within a few years’ time to locate, at a moderate cost, practically every case
of tuberculosis in the population....By these means we can stop the human and economic waste of chronic
disability and premature and unnecessary deaths... 274 The bill’s most immediate priority, however, was to
fund the screening and treatment of war workers and their families who were not often eligible for sanatorium
care because of state residence requirements.275
At the time of the bill, the number of deaths from tuberculosis was signiﬁcant enough to merit the highest
level of public health concern, and there was reason to believe it might climb even higher in the near future.
Tuberculosis caused sixty-thousand deaths in the United States annually, and was the most common cause of
death among people between the ages of ﬁfteen and thirty-ﬁve. The rate of the disease was even higher in the
African-American population, amounting to one third of all deaths of African-Americans between the ages
273June 21, 1944, Report [to accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and Revision of Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, by Mr. Thomas of Utah, from the Committee Education and Labor, 78th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Report No.
1027, pp. 6.
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Service, by Mr. Thomas of Utah, from the Committee Education and Labor, 78th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Report No.
1027, pp. 7.
63of twenty and thirty-four.276 Tuberculosis imposed greater economic costs than most fatal communicable
diseases, because it most often struck people in the prime of their productivity. To make matters worse,
history had shown that rates of tuberculosis usually increased after wars, due to the return of soldiers who
had contracted the disease abroad. In 1944, this caused even greater worries over an increased burden from
tuberculosis, particularly because the disease had spread in Europe during the war.277 This increase already
appeared in the United States at the time of the bill; according to the Metropolitan Insurance Company,
tuberculosis rose by 7.8 percent among its policyholders in the ﬁrst three months of 1944.278
The use of x-ray technology as a tuberculosis screen presented a way of addressing the most diﬃcult aspect
of the disease from a contagion standpoint: the problem of dealing with patients who were infected but not
yet contagious, since the disease only becomes contagious when the patient exhibits symptoms.279 Surgeon
General Parran argued the merits of mass x-ray screening on the basis of being able to keep those who are not
yet contagious from developing symptoms and infecting others, and also on the basis of improving the recovery
prospects of those being screened: The particular value of mass X-ray examinations is that two-thirds of
the cases discovered are in the earliest stage when recovery is almost certain, with good care.280 Absent a
276For some sense of scale, the rate of death from tuberculosis far outpaced the rate of death from war: Between 1776 and 1940
we have had 19 years of war in the United States and during that time there were 244,450 soldiers who died from the direct
eﬀect of war, but in 4 years, between 1937 and 1940, there were 254,688 people died of tuberculosis in this country. Statement
of Hon. A. L. miller, Representative from Nebraska, June 13 and 14, Hearing before a subcommittee of the committee on
interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to establish, for the investigation and control of tuberculosis, a division in the Public
Health Service, and other purposes, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 13. June 21, 1944, Report [to
accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and Revision of Laws Relating to the Public Health Service, by Mr. Thomas of Utah,
from the Committee Education and Labor, 78th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Report No. 1027, pp. 6.
277There has been a 13-percent increase in tuberculosis deaths in England. There are 1,500,000 new cases in France and
in the Low Countries there has been an enormous increase, and you cannot get any statistics out of Germany. Statement of
Dr. Victor Cullen, General Superintendent of the Maryland State Tuberculosis Sanatorium. June 13 and 14, Hearing before a
subcommittee of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to establish, for the investigation and control of
tuberculosis, a division in the Public Health Service, and other purposes, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session,
pp. 24.
278June 13 and 14, Hearing before a subcommittee of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to estab-
lish, for the investigation and control of tuberculosis, a division in the Public Health Service, and other purposes, House of
Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 24.
279Ibid., pp. 10.
280Statement of Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, United States Public Health Service. June 13 and 14, Hearing before a
subcommittee of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to establish, for the investigation and control of
tuberculosis, a division in the Public Health Service, and other purposes, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session,
pp. 32.
64mass examination program, these non-symptomatic tuberculosis victims would not present themselves for
medical care until their disease was 70 percent advanced, when their prospects for recovery were much less
hopeful.281 Prior to the bill’s passage, the resources were not available to screen on a large-scale. With the
armed forces examination stations rejecting over 100,000 people and sending them back to state and local
authorities, those facilities were completely overwhelmed by the numbers of at-risk and infected persons.282
Similarly, federal resources were unable to meet the needs of those infected, with only enough funding for
eight mobile x-ray units.283
The Gradual Post-War Relaxation of Federal Control
Though a snapshot of quarantine law in 1955 would not diﬀer substantially from one of quarantine law
in 1900, the comparison oﬀers insight into the translation of strict quarantine and inspection requirements
into relatively modern circumstances. In 1955, the default rule under federal quarantine policy was that all
airplanes and ships entering the United States were examined by federal medical inspectors. Some ships
were exempted, if their ports of origin were known to be free of infectious diseases, but even these underwent
281Statement of Dr. Victor Cullen, General Superintendent of the Maryland State Tuberculosis Sanatorium. June 13 and 14,
Hearing before a subcommittee of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to establish, for the investigation
and control of tuberculosis, a division in the Public Health Service, and other purposes, House of Representatives, 78th Congress,
2d Session, pp. 25.
282June 21, 1944, Report [to accompany H.R. 4624] on Consolidation and Revision of Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, by Mr. Thomas of Utah, from the Committee Education and Labor, 78th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Report No.
1027, pp. 6.
283June 13 and 14, Hearing before a subcommittee of the committee on interstate and foreign commerce, on A bill to estab-
lish, for the investigation and control of tuberculosis, a division in the Public Health Service, and other purposes, House of
Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 3.
65examination at their ports of departure.284 The diseases which were deemed quarantinable at the time
were similar to those in 1900: smallpox, cholera, yellow fever, typhus, and plague.285 After the passage of
the PHS Act, x-ray examinations for tuberculosis were included in the medical inspection of immigrants
and most visitors as well.286 In addition to these regulations, the 1946 Foreign Quarantine Regulations
imposed additional restrictions for the purpose of rabies prevention on the importation of dogs, cats, and
monkeys. Though the rabies vaccination requirements for cats and monkeys were eventually discontinued,
these animals are still subject to inspection at points of entry, and the vaccination requirement for dogs
continues today. Animals from areas known to have animal infections of various human-contagious diseases
were also barred.287
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act required that not only would every prospective immigrant
be medically examined prior to entry into the United States, but that he submit to a medical examination
before receiving a visa and departing for the United States. Though the 1952 Act required examinations for
every person applying for immigrant visas, it made medical examinations optional (at the discretion of the
consular oﬃcer) for those applying for nonimmigrant visas.288 In 1976, the issuance of a visa was determined
not to be suﬃcient to guarantee entry into the United States, only guaranteeing the holder the right to reach
the point of entry and be inspected at that point.289
Though the level of communicable disease vigilance shown in the 1955 snapshot resembles that of the turn of
284Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 98.
285This list of diseases is not to be confused with the much more extensive list of diseases which would prohibit
a person from immigrating to the United States. This shorter list of more dangerous diseases applies to everyone
who attempts to set foot on U.S. soil, rather than those who intend to immigrate. Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D.,
The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association of the United States Public Health
Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 98.
28621 FR 9829, December 12, 1956. Chapter 1, Subchapter C – Medical Care and Examinations, Part 34 – Medical Examination
of Aliens.
287Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 98.
2888 USCS Sec. 1201, Title 8: Aliens and Nationality, Chapter 12: Immigration and Nationality; Immigration; Issuance of
Entry Documents.
289Hermina Sague v. United States (1976, DC Puerto Rico) 416 F Supp 217.
66the century, the next decade would lead this protection into decline. As advances in medical technology during
the 1950’s and 1960’s (particularly the success of vaccines) succeeded in weakening communicable diseases,
public concern waned and the voice of anti-regulation commerce interests became louder and more credible.
Two primary factors led to a change in federal quarantine power which would fundamentally change the role
of federal quarantine power in public health policy. The ﬁrst of these factors was the tremendous victory over
smallpox. The Centers for Disease Control (a department of the Public Health Service) combined forces with
the World Health Organization in the 1960’s and 1970’s to end naturally-occurring smallpox worldwide.290
The other factor involved in weakening quarantine powers was an institutional one; because some in Congress
felt that the PHS should be more accountable to the public, they changed the its leadership from the relatively
autonomous Surgeon General to a political appointee, the Assistant Secretary for Health.291 Though it is
impossible to weigh the relative importance of these two factors, it is clear that both political and policy
concerns played a role in the deregulatory eﬀorts made in federal quarantine powers in the late 1960’s and
following decades.
A comparison of the Centers for Disease Control, Division of Quarantine’s inspection and quarantine policies
in 1967 and 1970 illustrates the 1967 reorganization’s dramatic changes.292 The Division of Quarantine itself
was transferred to CDC control in 1967, and the transfer signaled a change in the way quarantine was
viewed by both government and the public.293 The CDC Division of Quarantine primarily handled foreign
290Russell, Cristine, Centers for Disease Control: 40 Years of Demystifying Illness. The Washington Post, September 4, 1986.
First Section, Page A15, The Federal Page, pp. 2.
291Until the mid-1960s, PHS was led entirely by career commissioned oﬃcers...with no member of the civil service having
ever run a bureau. The Surgeon General, although appointed by the President, had always been a career member of the
Commissioned Corps. The 1968 reorganization transferred the responsibility for directing PHS from the Surgeon General to the
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientiﬁc Aﬀairs (a political appointee position that had been created originally as an adviser
to the Department Secretary). For the ﬁrst time, a noncareer oﬃcial became the top oﬃcial in PHS....In general, beginning in
this period the heads of PHS bureaus were increasingly not members of the Corps, and were frequently brought in from outside
the Federal government. The Surgeon General was no longer responsible for the management of PHS but became largely an
adviser and spokesperson on public health matters. Candidates for the position of Surgeon General no longer necessarily came
from the ranks of the Corps but were often appointed from outside PHS and commissioned upon their appointment. John L.
Parascandola, Public Health Service, pp. 487-93 in ed. George Thomas Kurian, A Historical Guide to the U.S. Government.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
292Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq.
293Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 6. This transfer had far from neutral eﬀects on the strength of
67quarantine issues, with the FDA (made a part of the PHS during the 1967 reorganization) responsible for
interstate quarantine issues.294 A number of measures were relaxed in the years after the transfer. In 1967,
each person entering the United States for any reason was required to present for inspection documentation
proving that he or she had been vaccinated against the quarantinable diseases. By the mid- to late-1970s,
due to the near-eradication of smallpox, no one was required to show proof of vaccination.295 (Interestingly,
the last natural case of smallpox was reported in Somalia in 1977, a full ten years after the U.S. signiﬁcantly
decreased its protections against entry of smallpox-infected travelers.296)
The infrastructure for inspecting and quarantining people arriving by airplane dissolved during this time as
well; separate arrival and inspection areas were no longer required by the mid-1970s, and passengers moved
unrestricted for health reasons into airports.297 Similarly, while in 1967 every boat and airplane arriving in
the United States from a foreign port was inspected by a federal quarantine inspector, by the mid-1970s, no
airplanes and boats were inspected unless the pilot reported an illness to the quarantine station.298 At the
same time, overseas inspections were drastically reduced, phasing medical inspectors out of the inspection
process.299 In the early 1970s, the federal government streamlined the multiple inspection process (involving
the Public Health Service, Immigration Service, Customs Service, and Department of Agriculture) so that
passengers enjoyed one stop inspection in which any one of these agencies could authorize their entry.300
quarantine powers. The journal entry of the Dr. Ray H. Vanderhook, Deputy Director, U.S. Quarantine Service and Medical
Oﬃcer in Charge, U.S. Quarantine Station, Staten Island, New York on November 20, 1967, reads Meeting at CDC with FQ
people and CDC people. Doesn’t look good for future of quarantine.
294The authority over interstate control of communicable human diseases shifted back to the CDC’s Division of Quarantine
in response to the reappearance of tuberculosis in 1992. Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 14.
295Even as early as 1967, the policy of requiring vaccinations was relaxed so that no vaccinations were required unless travelers
were from areas known to be infected with quarantinable diseases. Entry for December 4, 1967, Journal of Dr. Ray H.
Vanderhook, Deputy Director U.S. Quarantine Service; Medical Oﬃcer in Charge, U.S. Quarantine Station, Staten Island, NY.
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68The Division of Quarantine also began to reduce its role in cargo and animal inspections, allowing Customs
oﬃcers to perform these inspections as well.301
The relaxation of communicable disease vigilance during this time included the end of medical inspection at
the U.S.-Mexico border. In 1967, smallpox vaccinations were required for every person crossing the border.
Besides being a protective measure, this policy led to the free administration of more than 800,000 smallpox
vaccinations each year. By the late 1970s, however, the threat of smallpox no longer justiﬁed this expense.302
Tuberculosis had also been a long-feared disease which often found its way into the United States via Mexico,
and the quarantine policies of the 1960s required people crossing that border to show Border Crossing Cards
proving that they had been screened and were free of the disease. The CDC dropped this requirement in
the early 1970s,303 and by the late 1970s, there was no CDC presence at the Mexican border: [T]he border
...was virtually open for health purposes.304
Many of these deregulatory measures seem simply logical and eﬃcient. A switch to one stop inspections,
rather than the burden inspection by three diﬀerent agency inspectors, must have seemed like a clearly
superior move. One wonders, however, whether the policymakers involved intended to phase out medical
inspections altogether, or whether they expected one inspector to eﬀectively screen for agricultural, medical,
and commerce purposes. It is clear that the primary push against quarantine came from commerce interests,
to whom medical inspection and quarantine represented a costly and unnecessary barrier to trade.305 With
the great scourge of smallpox vanquished, quarantine opponents had their moment – a relatively disease-free
world in which fears of post-war importation of tropical diseases had faded from the cultural memory. In
this sense, the PHS quarantine oﬃcers had worked themselves out of a job. An article in the Journal of
U.S. Quarantine Service; Medical Oﬃcer in Charge, U.S. Quarantine Station, Staten Island, NY.
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69Commerce, written in 1967, summarized this feeling well with its criticism of archaic quarantine.306
The CDC’s own description of the deregulation accords with the criticism of pre-1967 quarantine policy as
unnecessarily costly. Because of this assessment, the CDC curtailed the quarantine program and changed
its focus from routine inspection to program management and problem intervention.307 This change in
focus resulted from the conclusion that dangerous communicable diseases had been largely eradicated, and
that the only signiﬁcant danger would come from isolated hot spots. In 1979, the Division of Quarantine
further relaxed control of foreign disease immigration by discontinuing the routine spraying of aircraft due
to the concerns about the health eﬀects of pesticides and the lack of evidence that aircraft spraying played
a signiﬁcant role in disease control,308. The CDC also discontinued the mosquito surveys it had conducted
near airports and sea ports (in order to monitor yellow fever and malaria threats), relying instead on local
authorities to perform this function.309 In order to identify and protect against hot spot outbreaks, the CDC
developed a surveillance program to monitor emerging epidemics in other countries. The Division of Global
Migration and Quarantine, which administered this surveillance program, was authorized under the PHS
Act to detain, medically examine, or conditionally release individuals and wildlife suspected of carrying a
communicable disease.310
Soon after the decline in medical inspections of ships abroad and upon entry into the United States, serious
outbreaks of gastrointestinal diseases began to occur on cruise ships. When the problem became signiﬁcant,
in the early 1970s, the CDC’s Division of Quarantine initiated sanitation surveys and an inspection program,
leading to the beginning of the Vessel Sanitation Program in 1975.311 Though the Vessel Sanitation Program
306Journal of Dr. Ray H. Vanderhook, Deputy Director U.S. Quarantine Service; Medical Oﬃcer in Charge, U.S. Quarantine
Station, Staten Island, NY. December 7, 1967.
307History of Quarantine, from CDC web site: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/history.htm.
308Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 7.
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310History of Quarantine, from CDC web site: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/history.htm.
311Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 14, and Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, September 28, 1994 by
Richard J. Jackson, Director of the National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, pp.
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70was authorized under Section 361 of the PHS Act, cooperation with the program is voluntary and funded by
fees charged to the ships.312 Even for those ships that did participate in the program, the level of enforcement
is slight. If a ship receives a failing score on its inspection exam, it is merely reinspected within thirty to
sixty days. If the ship shows an imminent health hazard, however, the inspector can recommend that the
ship not sail.313 Though this recommendation has been made only rarely (ﬁve times since 1987), the CDC
has enforced its recommendation against disobedient cruise lines, as in the following situation in which a
ship disregarded the recommendation against sailing:
This ship was boarded upon its return to a U.S. port, and with the assistance of the U.S.
Coast Guard, CDC was prepared to detain the ship to port. The ship’s management was
able to implement immediate corrective actions which removed the imminent health risk. At
any time, the Director of CDC may determine that failure to implement corrective actions
presents a threat of introduction of communicable diseases into the United States and may
take additional action to include detention of the ship in port.314
This detention power, though reminiscent of earlier quarantines for on-board sanitation problems, is much
more limited in scope and in actual enforcement. The fact of voluntary cooperation, despite the insurance
incentives for cruise ships to cooperate with the program, separates this program entirely from a system
in which federal oﬃcers inspected every vessel destined for the United States not only for gastrointestinal
disease-related sanitation, but for the communicable health of is passengers and crew as well.
Though the practical applications of Section 361 weakened during the 1960s and 1970s315, courts still deferred
to agencies in the exercise of those powers. State of Louisiana et al. v. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
involved a challenge to a regulation by the Food and Drug Administration, promulgated under the authority
of Section 361 of the PHS Act, which banned the sale and distribution of small turtles.316 The plaintiﬀ,
312Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, September 28, 1994 by Richard J. Jackson, Director of the National Center for Environ-
mental Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, pp. 2-3.
313Ibid., pp. 3.
315This regulation formalizes the series of deregulating and modernizing moves during the 1970s. 50 FR 1516, January 11,
1985, amending the regulations in 42 CFR Part 71. From Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control, ﬁnal rule with discussion of comments, 50 FR 1516, January 11, 1985, amending the regulations in 42 CFR Part 71.
316State of Louisiana et al. v. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, et al. Civ. A. No. 75-1941.
71the State of Louisiana (on behalf of the National Turtle Farmers and Shippers Association) sought to en-
join the ban on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and exceeded the FDA’s authority under
the Act.317 The plaintiﬀs contended that the regulation exceeded the FDA’s authority because it banned
both infected and uninfected small turtles, whereas (plaintiﬀs argued) the FDA was authorized to prohibit
only the interstate shipment of turtles which may spread communicable disease,318. The court concluded,
however, that the ban on turtles could not be so limited because it could not be shown that a total ban was
unnecessary to prevent the spread of disease.319 The plaintiﬀs also argued that the regulation’s attempt to
control intrastate commerce exceeded the PHS Act’s scope. The court rejected this claim as well, deferring
to the FDA’s judgment that the ban on the intrastate sale of turtles was necessary to prevent the interstate
spread of the diseases Salmonella and Arizona.320 In upholding the regulation, the court referred to the
broad, ﬂexible powers granted to federal health authorities who must use their judgment in attempting to
protect the public against the spread of communicable disease,321.
Authority under Section 361 also left to the CDC the discretion to deﬁne a list of diseases that would serve
as grounds for quarantine and detention, and another list of diseases which would be grounds for rejecting
an applicant for immigration. During the period of the 1970s, this too was streamlined. Prior to 1971,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 427 F. Supp. 174. February 4, 1977, pp. 175.
317Plaintiﬀs argued against the regulation on other grounds as well, but the arguments ad-
dressed here include only those relevant to the limits to the FDA’s power under the PHS Act.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 427 F. Supp. 174. February 4, 1977, pp. 175.
318Plaintiﬀs based this argument on previous regulations banning only infected psittacine birds and infected lather brushes.
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every turtle, or lot of turtles, is to be tested every week so as to ﬁnd that percent which becomes reinfected. Such a testing
alternative is patently unreasonable, and a total ban is permissible as necessary to prevent the spread of communicable disease.
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72the list of dangerous contagious diseases which disqualiﬁed potential immigrants included several parasitic
and fungal diseases which could be fatal if untreated. However, because these diseases were not directly
transmittable from person to person, the CDC removed them from the list.322 The list was last amended in
1987 (adding HIV), to include the following eight diseases: chancroid, gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, HIV,
infectious leprosy, lymphanogranuloma venereum, infectious syphilis, and active tuberculosis. It is worth
noting that six of these eight diseases are generally sexually transmitted.323 Although the removal of the
treatable, diﬃcult-to-transmit, parasitic and fungal diseases seems logical, some health policy experts have
questioned why Hepatitis B and malaria, which can be transmitted in some of the same ways as HIV and
syphilis, are not listed.324
Of course, these are not the only diseases which will prevent a person from moving freely into the United
States. The list of quarantinable diseases, promulgated by Executive Order, deﬁnes those diseases for which
federal medical oﬃcers have the power to detain, isolate, or conditionally release people. This list grew
to include as many as twenty-six diseases, but was reduced after 1982, removing: anthrax, dengue fever,
leprosy, ringworm, and several sexually transmitted diseases. Since that time, the list has included: suspected
smallpox, cholera, yellow fever, plague, diptheria, infectious tuberculosis, and viral hemorrhagic fevers (i.e.
Ebola virus and others).325
Regulations passed in 1985 formalized the regulatory relaxation that had evolved since 1967. The 1985
regulations lifted the previous requirement that a vessel departing for a U.S. port must obtain and deliver
322Bennett, Victoria L., Medical Examination of Aliens: A Policy with Ailments of its Own? University of Arkansas at Little
Rock Law Journal, Fall 1989, v. 12, n. 4, pp. 739-753, pp. 745-746.
323Ibid., pp. 746 and 42 CFR 34.2. Revised as of February 25, 2002.
324Bennett, Victoria L., Medical Examination of Aliens: A Policy with Ailments of its Own? University of Arkansas at Little
Rock Law Journal, Fall 1989, v. 12, n. 4, pp. 739-753, pp. 747.
325Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 1 and 42 USCS 264 (aka §361 of the PHS Act). This is the 2001
version.
73a bill of health.326 They also formally discontinued a measure which had, in the previous half century,
helped control plague – rodent inspection of vessels.327 Most signiﬁcantly, the regulations also formalized
the practice of controlled free pratique which had evolved over the previous twenty years. This practice
allowed ship captains to radio ahead to the quarantine station attesting to the health of the ship, thus
exempting the ship from medical inspection.328 With this freedom, however, came responsibility. 42 CFR
71.21(a) requires that:
the master of a ship destined for a U.S. port shall report immediately to the quarantine
station at or nearest the port at which the ship will arrive, the occurrence, on board, of any
death or any ill person among passengers or crew (including those who have disembarked
or have been removed) during the 15-day period preceding the date of expected arrival or
during the period since departure from a U.S. port (whichever period of time is shorter).329
Subsection (b) made the same requirements of aircraft commanders.330 Granting of a controlled free pratique
did not prevent inspectors from boarding a ship or plane in order to conﬁrm that conditions were as reported.
However, the switch to controlled free pratique drastically diminished the number of medical inspections
performed on arriving vessels and airplanes.331
The decreased level of daily vigilance in quarantine and inspection was matched by a decrease in resources. In
1985, six years after the CDC formally ceased its mosquito surveys and its practice of spraying airplanes with
pesticides, a variety of mosquito previously unknown in the United States was found in Texas. The Aedes
albopictus (Asian tiger) mosquito, native to East Asia, is a vector of dengue fever and encephalitis. After
the CDC’s study of the infestation revealed that the mosquitoes had been imported in used tire casings, it
required importers of used tire casings from Asia to disinfect their imports prior to shipment. Nonetheless,
32642 CFR 71.11. From 50 FR 1519, Jan. 11, 1985. Current through Feb. 25, 2002.
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74the CDC reported that it was unable to fully monitor and enforce this requirement because of resource
problems.332 This reduction in resources, while at least arguably merited, is striking. According to the
CDC, In 1967, at the time of the transfer to the CDC, the Division [of Quarantine] operated 55 quarantine
stations and 43 medical examination posts abroad with a staﬀ of over 600. Today, the Division of Quarantine
operates 7 quarantine stations and two overseas posts with a [total] staﬀ of 70 employees.333
Issues in Current Quarantine Law
The current version of Section 361 of the PHS Act does not diﬀer measurably from the its predecessors.334
332Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 8. These resource problems also seemed to stiﬂe a moment in
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Rochell, Anne, CDC at 50: Crusades and Controversies. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, January 21, 1996, page 02H,
pp. 2.
333Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 11.
33442 U.S.C. 264. Regulations to control communicable diseases:
(a) Promulgation and enforcement by Surgeon General. The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Administrator [Sec-
retary], is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession. For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General
may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles
found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his
judgment may be necessary.
(b) Apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals. Regulations prescribed under this section shall not provide
for the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals except for purpose of preventing the introduction, trans-
mission, or spread of such communicable diseases as may be speciﬁed from time to time in Executive orders of the President
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(c) Application of regulations to persons entering from foreign countries. Except as provided in subsection (d), regulations
prescribed under this section, insofar as they provide for the apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional release of
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(d) Apprehension and examination of persons reasonably believed to be infected. On recommendation of the National Advisory
Health Council, regulations prescribed under this section may provide for the apprehension and examination of any individual
reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a communicable state and (1) to be moving or about to move
75However, the implementation of the Act diﬀers substantially from the days when federal agents stood on
the front line against the international and interstate travel of disease. The changes in implementation have
involved both a diminishing federal public health presence and an increased level of responsibility delegated
to the states. One of the primary ways in which the Division of Quarantine was able to downsize was
by outsourcing its medical examination functions to other agencies and to state authorities. The primary
agency to which this responsibility has been transferred is the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which
designates and reviews medical inspections of immigrants conducted by civil surgeons.335 The Division
of Quarantine provides technical instructions and advice to those physicians, as well as to inspectors of
the Customs Service, Department of Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The instructions to
these agencies provide a summary of practical implementation of the current regulations promulgated under
Section 361 of the PHS Act. (See Appendix A.) If the inspectors from these agencies detect a situation of
public health interest, they notify the CDC’s Division of Quarantine so that it can provide assistance.336 In
addition to sharing its inspection authority with these agencies, as of August 2000, the CDC again shares
its regulatory authority over communicable diseases with the FDA. While the CDC retains authority for the
interstate quarantine of people, the FDA exercises authority over animals and objects.337
The use of state resources for quarantine and medical inspection seems to signify a return to the local roots
of quarantine law. Many aspects of federal-state cooperation seem entirely necessary. For instance, since
1980, the CDC has provided states with information regarding immigrant medical records, and now has
a notiﬁcation system through which it alerts state health departments to the arrival of immigrants with
from a State to another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infection to individuals who, while infected with such disease in a
communicable stage, will be moving from a State to another State. Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any
such individual is found to be infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary.
For purposes of this subsection, the term State includes, in addition to the several States, only the District of Columbia. 42
USCS Sec. 264.
335Medical Examinations from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers
for Disease Control web site: www.cdc.gov.
336Field Operations from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control web site: www.cdc.gov.
337Federal Register, August 16, 2000: Final Rule allocating communicable disease control power between FDA and CDC.
76serious diseases like tuberculosis or HIV.338 As federal quarantine enforcement has minimized over the post-
war decades, all states have retained authority to quarantine individuals for communicable diseases, allowing
them to respond to such warnings with their own resources.339 The Federal Refugee Act mandates that
states provide medical screening of all refugees arriving in the United States in order to follow-up with
those already known to carry infectious diseases and to screen recent arrivals for diseases which may have
developed after their pre-screening at their ports of departure.340 Unfortunately, however, states are often
unable to perform the tasks of monitoring these refugees, frequently failing to perform re-screenings within
the required thirty-day period.341 Further, the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in screening procedures between states
make it diﬃcult to monitor the medical records of immigrants who move from state to state (a serious
problem in the case of migrant workers) and ensure the proper level of medical supervision.342
In addition to the problems with refugee re-screening, states seem to have trouble monitoring and controlling
disease generally. A survey of all state communicable disease control systems reported in the Columbia Law
Review in 1999 concluded that state-level public health infrastructure was in decline.343 This conclusion was
supported by a 1988 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which determined the state-based public
health system to be inadequate to protect the public health. According to the IOM, the United States
had let down [its] public health guard as a nation, and the health of the public is unnecessarily threatened
as a result.344 Though some might quarrel with this conclusion, one cannot argue that the public health
338Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 11-12. The Refugee Act of 1980 created waivers of excludability
which allowed for the immigration of some aliens who were infected with HIV or tuberculosis: An alien with an excludable
medical condition may apply to the Attorney General for a waiver if they meet certain criteria. For a communicable disease
such as tuberculosis or human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) infection they must have certain familial relationship with a legal
resident of the United States. Division of Quarantine publication. www.cdc.gov/dq, pp. 11
339Grad, Frank P., Communicable Disease and Mental Health: Restrictions of the Person. American Journal of Law &
Medicine, Fall-Winter 1986, v. 12, n. 3 & 4, pp. 381-403, pp. 387.
340Kennedy, James, MD MBA; Deborah J. Seymour, PsyD; Barbara J. Hummel, RN. A Comprehensive Refugee Health
Screening Program. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Rep 1999; 114: 469-477, pp. 3.
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342Ibid., pp. 2.
343Gostin, Lawrence O., Scott Burris, and Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease
Law in the United States. Columbia Law Review, January 1999, v. 99, i. 1, pp. 59-128, pp. 66.
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77infrastructure has been signiﬁcantly strengthened since the time the IOM made its report. Funding for
public health purposes at both the federal and state level has either decreased or remained constant over
this period, particularly in regard to communicable disease monitoring. Since states have the responsibility
to monitor and report outbreaks of communicable disease to the CDC, their ability to perform that function
is crucial to the success of national communicable disease control. Nonetheless, state and local funding for
communicable disease monitoring decreased during the 1990s, with less than $75 million allotted to this
function in an average year.345
The requirements for medical inspections also raise questions about how eﬀective that system can be in
achieving its goals even if its proscriptions are thoroughly enforced.346 Current law still only requires medical
examinations for those foreign visitors applying for immigrant status. Those seeking only temporary or other
alien status may be examined at the discretion of a consular or immigration oﬃcer if the oﬃcer has reason
to believe that the applicant carries a communicable disease.347
Though an immigrant who stays in the United States permanently will certainly have more time and more
opportunities to spread disease, an alien visitor who carries an infectious disease into the country for only a
matter of weeks still presents a serious public health threat.348 Though the consular oﬃcers who issue even
temporary visas are supposed to report visitors who show signs of illness to a medical examiner, most of the
diseases for which the law requires exclusion cannot be detected without a full medical examination which
is well beyond the expertise of a consular oﬃcer.349
345Ibid., pp. 96.
346
347Medical Examinations from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers
for Disease Control web site: www.cdc.gov.
348Bennett, Victoria L., Medical Examination of Aliens: A Policy with Ailments of its Own? University of Arkansas at Little
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78Concerns for the Future
The history of federal use of the quarantine and inspection power shows how that power was shaped by
the medical and epidemic state of the world. In this era of antibiotics, vaccines, and rapid international
travel, it may seem both unnecessary and impracticable to implement medical inspection and quarantine
with the scrutiny used a century ago. However, we face conditions today – outbreaks of communicable
diseases worldwide and bioterrorism – which present the possibility that widespread epidemics may recur.
These problems are not currently plaguing the United States, but the experience of AIDS and the warning
knell of last fall’s anthrax attacks may present a template for unforeseen future troubles. The diﬃculty of
anticipating future needs is that, in the present, the enemy which one is battling is imaginary, and thus
diﬃcult to summon political support against. Nonetheless, as one commentator at the Center for Civilian
Biodefense Strategies at Johns Hopkins University said, in order to prepare for success, you don’t skate to
where the puck is; you skate to where it’s going to be.350
Scott Burris argued in the Houston Law Review that the specter of communicable disease is not coming back,
but that it never actually left us: Only thirty years separate the eﬀective control of polio in the mid-ﬁfties
and the emergence of HIV in the United States.351 Currently, infectious diseases rank as the third cause of
death in the United States, and are responsible for annual costs of approximately $120 billion as well as 25%
350O’Toole, Tara, MD, MPH, and Thomas V. Inglesby, MD, Epidemic Response Scenario: Decision Making in a Time of
Plague. Public Health Rep (Suppl 2) 2001; 116: 92-103. March 2001, April 2001.
351Burris, Scott, Law as a Structural Factor in the Spread of Communicable Disease. Houston Law Review, Dec. 30, 1999, v.
36, i. 5, p. 1755-1786, pp. 1757.
79of all visits to doctors.352 Today, AIDS is not the only frightening communicable disease which threatens us;
deaths from communicable diseases worldwide grew by 58% between 1980 and 1992, and the last decade has
seen outbreaks of deadly diseases like tuberculosis, Hanta virus, Ebola, Legionnaire’s Disease, encephalitis,
and salmonella.353 Further, global disease conditions continue to foster even more diseases; according to
the World Health Organization, over thirty new communicable diseases were identiﬁed between 1980 and
2000.354 In addition to the new diseases, some which had previously been abated (yellow fever, cholera,
and dengue) became more prevalent.355 The ability of insects to introduce deadly diseases into the United
States was proven in the summer of 1999, with the small outbreak of West Nile virus in New York.356 The
continuing increase of globalization in travel and trade only speeds the processes by which new diseases can
reach our shores from areas once too remote to touch the rest of the world.357
Airplane travel is, of course, the primary means by which diseases travel long distances. The speed and
availability of travel, however, is not the only unique communicable disease threat airplanes present. Because
of the lack of ventilation standards for airplanes, they can become ﬂying petri dishes for disease incubation.358
This unhealthy aspect of ﬂight not only endangers the other passengers on planes that carry an infectious
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80passenger, but also can multiply the threat presented by a single infectious passenger to the destination
country. Some recent near-disasters illustrate the potential consequences of airborne disease. For example,
eleven passengers arriving from India were identiﬁed by New York City health oﬃcials as carrying bubonic
plague into the United States in 1994. Even more recently, in spring of 2000, four passengers returning to
the United States from Saudi Arabia after the annual hajj (to which 15,000 U.S. residents traveled) were
diagnosed with extremely contagious and potentially deadly meningococcal diseases.359
The possibility of dangerous communicable diseases being introduced into the United States by airplane is
made even more serious by the increasing rate of drug-resistance in some of these diseases. Drug resistant
strains of disease evolve due to incomplete treatment with antibiotics, and from general low-dose exposure
to antibiotics over time.360 Physicians have identiﬁed multi-drug resistant strains (i.e. varieties of disease
that do not respond to the usual arsenal of antibiotics) of both tuberculosis and streptococcus.361 The emer-
gence of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) has been particularly striking; seventeen states had
reported cases of MDR-TB by 1994. Because the majority of tuberculosis infections are borne by immigrants
from countries with much higher rates of tuberculosis (primarily Mexico and Southeast Asian countries362),
359Sharkey, Joe, The Nation; And You thought Germs in the Subway Were Bad. The New York Times, March 11, 2001,
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of the disease. NPR report, 4/25/2002.
81immigration-rich areas of the United States tend to have higher rates of the disease than others.363 The
drug-resistant form of tuberculosis is far more deadly than its drug-sensitive predecessor. Only 60% of pa-
tients diagnosed with MDR-TB are eventually cured, and the disease is fatal to 80% of HIV-infected patients
who contract it.364
Drug-resistant strains of communicable diseases like tuberculosis present new and knotty legal and policy
problems. The factors that contributed to the emergence of MDR-TB reveal the ways in which it raises is-
sues of involuntary detention for even those who are not yet infectious. In 1987, federal health oﬃcials were
conﬁdent that tuberculosis would soon be eliminated, due to the steady thirty-year decline of the disease
and success in using multiple drug therapy. However, by the end of the 1980s, it was clear that tuberculosis
was again on the rise, increasing by 20% between 1985 and 1992.365 Because tuberculosis exists in both
symptomatic and non-symptomatic states and requires a long regimen of antibiotics to be fully cured, the
greatest risk of MDR-TB comes from patients who stop taking their antibiotics after their symptoms have
abated but before the regimen is complete.366 Unlike the days when tuberculosis patients were kept in
specialized sanatoria, supervising patients today on an outpatient basis and forcing them to take medication
is nearly impossible.367 Once a patient does develop MDR-TB, not only is his risk of death elevated, but
the costs of his treatment skyrocket. According to the World Health Organization, treatment of MDR-TB is
one hundred times as costly as treating drug-sensitive forms of tuberculosis and requires intravenous drugs,
chemotherapy, and sometimes surgery.368
363...tuberculosis continues to rise in Northern Virginia, where state health oﬃcials say immigration is fueling the spread,. In
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82The need to ensure that tuberculosis patients take their antibiotics has led some public health theorists
to consider detaining those patients who are at risk of transmitting the disease. Because those patients in
unsymptomatic (and, therefore, not contagious) phases of the disease are less likely to take their medica-
tion and may subsequently develop MDR-TB, health oﬃcers would have to be able to detain even those
tuberculosis patients who are not presently contagious.369 States do not currently detain unsymptomatic
patients, partially because of the questionable constitutionality of the proposal.370 Substantive due process
protections against unjustiﬁed detention may require proving that an unsymptomatic patient is likely to be-
come contagious soon, or that she engages in behaviors that make her more likely to develop MDR-TB (i.e.
failure to take medication consistently).371 The power to compel tuberculosis patients to take antibiotics
would likely survive a constitutional challenge, in much the same way that state laws requiring mandatory
vaccinations have been upheld.372
Even if this problem were solved, however, the diﬃculties presented by undiagnosed persons infected with
tuberculosis carrying the disease into the country would persist. Because only those applying for immigrant
or refugee status are tested for tuberculosis, all other visitors to the United States enter without being tested
for the disease. Though tuberculosis is not usually transmitted in one-time encounters, instead passing
usually to those who spend signiﬁcant time with the infected person, it spreads much more easily in facilities
with poor ventilation.373 Given the earlier discussion of airplanes as excellent disease hosts due to bad
ventilation, tuberculosis seems quite likely to be transmitted in that environment. Nevertheless, the CDC
appears to have rejected the notion of more widespread testing of foreign travelers for tuberculosis. Ken
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83Castro, the Director of Tuberculosis Elimination at the CDC, has maligned the idea: Imagine if...you needed
a chest X-ray to go to London or France.374 Instead, Castro reiterated the CDC’s recent approach to all
communicable diseases – to try to stem them at their source: The more important way to solve the problem
is to reduce the rate in countries that are highly impacted.375
Though present-day public health policymakers do not embrace the quarantine inspection policies of the
past, mainstream authorities have begun to cast the communicable disease threat in terms of national
security. Even before the attack of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax assault which followed, the National
Intelligence Council (a division of the Central Intelligence Agency) reported to Congress that new and re-
emerging infectious diseases will pose a rising – and in the worst case, catastrophic – global health threat that
will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years.376 David F. Gordon, who testiﬁed before
the House panel, argued that the greatest domestic threat came from diseases carried by people traveling by
airplane and from objects shipped from abroad. Further, argued Gordon, national security was threatened
even by diseases that did not reach our shores, because of the danger to U.S. citizens traveling abroad and
to armed forces stationed in other countries.377
Because even diseases which never reach U.S. shores threaten our security, and because of the impossibility
of keeping prevalent diseases completely outside of the country, the current dominant approach to defense
against the communicable disease threat is not to barricade the borders against disease. Rather, the strategy
proposed by the Surgeon General and pursued by the CDC is to detect diseases early in their points of origin
and stop them before they gain momentum.378 In 1999, Surgeon General Satcher articulated this view:
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84The health of the American people cannot be fully protected unless eﬀorts are focused on
maintaining a system of worldwide health surveillance. It is startling to think that in under
thirty-six hours, ...an individual, a disease, or a product can travel from any one point on
the globe to another, and thereby pose a serious threat to the health of the entire world.379
Though this preventative approach dominates current thinking about communicable diseases, renewed focus
on the possibility of bioterrorism has recently led health oﬃcials to reconsider their abilities to implement
wide-scale quarantines. A bioterrorist attack involving smallpox, one of the most often-cited bioterrorism
possibilities, could require swift quarantines of entire towns and cities. Though practical responsibility for
communicable diseases inside the United States (rather than at its borders) has been shifting to the states
over the last three decades, even large states like Texas have had no experience in implementing this sort
of large area quarantine.380 Doubtless, state authorities would receive assistance from federal oﬃcers and
military resources in the case of a widespread smallpox attack, but as yet there is no clear set of procedures
through which federal, state, and local health authorities would interact in an emergency situation.
The CDC recognizes this problem and has tried to suggest a template for state response to a smallpox
emergency.381 The CDC’s working document outlining steps states should take to prepare for a bioterrorist
attack identiﬁes the problems inherent in having a large-scale outbreak governed by diﬀerent state public
health laws and authorities:
Limited experience with the application and success of various quarantine measures pre-
cludes inclusion of standardized guidelines for the implementation of such measures during
a bioterrorism event at this time. However, what has been learned during these [simulated
bioterrorism events] is that state quarantine laws are in most cases dated and varied. Each
state must undertake a review of their own authorities and revise and update their laws to
assure suﬃcient legal powers to carry out an eﬀective response.382
380Jacobson, Sherry, On guard in case of epidemic: States asked to beef up quarantine powers. The Dallas Morning News,
November 19, 2001, Page 1C, pp. 1.
381For smallpox, a single case of suspected or conﬁrmed infection warrants immediate public health action including appropriate
isolation of the known or presumed infected individual, and initiation of active epidemiologic investigation, contact tracing,
vaccination, and enhanced surveillance. Centers for Disease Control, Interim Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, Guide
C: Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines. January 23, 2002. Pp. 17.
85Though Section 361 authorizes the federal government to intervene in a state’s quarantine procedure if it
is inadequate to control the spread of disease, the reaction of ﬁrst-responders to an emergency is clearly of
critical importance in the case of a highly contagious disease.
In addition to the problem of competent and immediate state response to an outbreak, the interaction of
state and federal agencies is particularly complex. The CDC acknowledges that this, too, has not yet been
ironed out:
In addition, the division of legal authority between the state and Federal governments
requires rapid and eﬃcient coordination of actions to provide a public health response,
and should be recognized as an essential part of the overall smallpox response plan.383
In the case of an outbreak involving multiple states, one can imagine situations in which diﬀering state
laws or diﬀering state interests could collide, forcing federal authorities to side with one state over another.
This could lead to situations reminiscent of the 19th century yellow fever shotgun quarantines, where state
authorities could not move through towns determined to protect their people from any intruders.
The diﬃculties of state-to-state and federal-state interaction were well-exhibited in a simulation at the Center
for Civilian Biodefense Strategies at Johns Hopkins University.384 The simulation involved a bioterrorist
attack of bubonic plague (a far less contagious disease than smallpox) on a hypothetical city. As the disease
expanded due to inadequate quarantine and hospital facilities, as well as slow diagnosis, the question of
forced isolation arose. Once the disease crossed state lines, neighboring states began to inhibit interstate
travel at their borders, and those who feared they might be infected ﬂed for states that did not implement
forced quarantines.385 At the end of the exercise, the participants came to the frightening conclusion that
384O’Toole, Tara, MD, MPH, and Thomas V. Inglesby, MD, Epidemic Response Scenario: Decision Making in a Time of
Plague. Public Health Rep (Suppl 2) 2001; 116: 92-103. March 2001, April 2001, pp. 1.
385Ibid., pp. 12-13.
86We are not, as a nation, going to be able to invoke multiple quarantines across the country and enforce
them.386
Professor of public health law David P. Fidler argues that the federal separation of public health powers puts
the United States in a particularly weak position to deal with bioterrorist attacks. In a speech before the
Department of Health and Human Services, Fidler posed as Rumpole the Malevolent, a lawyer advising a
bioterrorist on what kind of legal system would render a country most vulnerable to his evil plans. Rumpole
advised his client that:
[Y]our ideal target would be a federal system that has placed public health powers predomi-
nantly at the local level....With public health powers vested primarily in local governments,
defenses against bioterrorism are only as strong as the local governments’ commitment to
public health. In addition, with public health powers at the local level, there is more room
for diversity and diﬀerence across the nation, which undermines a harmonized or coordinated
approach to a public health emergency.387
Though public health issues have traditionally been the responsibility of state and local governments in
the United States, Fidler argues that the proper template for bioterrorism-related law is not public health
law, but national security law. If we view bioterrorism this way, he argues, it becomes clear that federal
control should be the primary approach: This country has never developed a legal framework for a national
security threat in which state governments are as or more important than the federal government.388 Fidler’s
argument leads one to the conclusion that the event of a bioterrorist emergency may not be the opportune
time to experiment with new paradigms for protecting national security.
Even greater than the separation of legal powers, however, is the problem of resources. Fidler argues that
even if state laws did not conﬂict in problematic ways, and if state and federal authorities were able to co-
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87ordinate activities eﬀectively, most state and local public health infrastructures do not possess the resources
necessary to handle a full-scale bioterrorist attack. In order to implement multiple quarantines, these govern-
ments would require adequate facilities (or at least the ability to claim adequate facilities quickly), adequate
transport vehicles, and – most importantly – an adequate supply of persons trained to deal with this sort
of crisis. Though state resources are clearly important in this function, absent a strategy to compel states
to strengthen their public health systems, the federal government bears the responsibility of ensuring that
disease outbreaks will be competently mitigated. The system of domestic disease surveillance at the CDC,
which collects information from local health departments and serves as a contact point for local authorities
experiencing health emergencies, presents one tool that might compensate for state weaknesses. The com-
municable disease surveillance system is staﬀed largely by PHS oﬃcers, who also antibiotics, vaccines, and
facilities for diagnosis and treatment in the event of health emergencies.389 These oﬃcers represent the most
specialized practical expertise in communicable disease control, and Congress has (in past years) expressed
its desire to see that capability expanded. In 1997, 1998, and 1999, Congress provided funding and a man-
date for the Department of Health and Human Services to increase the ranks of the PHS Reserve Corps.
Despite this mandate, the PHS Reserve Corps, a collection of trained health specialists (physicians, dentists,
nurses, and environmental engineers) who could be deployed in a manner similar to military reserves, was
not expanded.390 Since 1989, the number of reserve oﬃcers has decreased from roughly 6,000 to 2,500.391
Conclusion
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88The perennial fact of ﬁnite resources requires that every society bear some risk of even the most serious
threats. Though we identify weaknesses in our communicable disease security systems, the relevant question
is whether ﬁxing those weaknesses can be done in a way that does not require neglecting even more impor-
tant eﬀorts. It is intuitively clear that this cost-beneﬁt analysis compelled the decision to reduce medical
inspections in favor of controlled free pratique as the risk of many major diseases decreased and treatment
prospects improved. In that vein, though we identify the ﬂaws in a system which thoroughly examines only
those aliens who enter the United States on a permanent immigrant or refugee basis, we also realize that
fully examining all those entering the country could be prohibitively costly.392 Further, the diplomatic strain
and cost to the travel industry that could result from requiring travelers to undergo medical examinations
would likely be too great to make this policy either desirable or politically realistic. Similarly, though state
public health laws and resources may be inadequate to deal with possible bioterrorist attacks, complete
federal takeover of the state police power to regulate for the purpose of protecting public health would be
Constitutional anathema and ﬁscally unthinkable.
Despite the reality of scarce resources and state police powers, however, Section 361 of the PHS Act directs
the Surgeon General to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or
possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.393 Because the long arc of
history has shown that states have not been able to ﬁll this role, the federal government must take action as
392...[E]ach alien would have to undergo a complete physical including chest x-ray, blood tests for HIV and syphilis, and
cultures to exclude the presence of other detectable diseases. A conservative estimate of the cost of such an examination puts
the cost in excess of $150 per person, Bennett, Victoria L., Medical Examination of Aliens: A Policy with Ailments of its Own?
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal, Fall 1989, v. 12, n. 4, pp. 751.
393March 1,2,3,7,8,9,10, and 14, 1944: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 3379: A Bill to Codify the Laws Relating to the Public Health
Service, and for Other Purposes, pp. 16.
89the sole protector of its citizens from the international and interstate transmission of communicable diseases.
Though legal scholars naturally focus on the broad language of the law and the lawmaking power granted
under it, it is not the lawmaking power that at this moment requires attention. The legislative history of
the bill and the upholding of regulations against challenge has shown that this lawmaking power is quite
strong. Instead, the single most important word in this statute today is enforce. As David Fidler concluded,
People forget that the ’rule of law’ goes beyond, and must go beyond, merely having legal powers on the
books. The legal power to act in the public good must be supported by resources...to undertake eﬀectively
the legal authority that exists.394
What, then, do we make of the broad power allocated to the federal government to protect against commu-
nicable diseases under Section 361 of the PHS Act? How is it useful in protecting us from the new sources
of communicable diseases that we face today? Since the law itself provides ample power to protect against
communicable diseases, the improvements needed today are on the level of enforcement. Comprehensively
identifying the speciﬁc needed improvements requires ﬁrst-hand knowledge of the logistics involved in medi-
cal screening and emergency response which goes beyond the scope of this paper. There are, however, a few
areas in which speciﬁc improvements seem merited even without this detailed operational experience:
1.
As discussed earlier, it is likely impractical to recommend full medical inspections of all aliens entering the United States. However, the current state of medical screening (generally performed by customs and/or INS oﬃcials) may require some operational revamping. The eﬃciency of one-stop screening is clearly desirable, but recent questions about agency-wide incompetence at the INS may suggest that implementing this policy through another agency (or through a new subdivision of the Department of the Treasury) would be preferable to the current division of responsibilities.
394Fidler, David P., JD. Legal Issues Surrounding Public Health Emergencies, Public Health Report, (Suppl 2) 2001; 116:
79-86. 2001 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Public Health Reports, March, 2001 / April, 2001, pp. 3.
902.
In addition to the question of general agency competence, it may be necessary to improve the level of medical knowledge of those performing the screenings of non-immigrant aliens. The current process, in which international passengers are looked-over by an INS or Customs oﬃcer armed only with minimal training and a list of obvious signs of disease, guarantees that some travelers with subtler symptoms will slip through undetected. If inspectors with real medical training are needed, then the suggestion of an increased PHS Reserve Corps (whose members might serve this function for one weekend per month) may help address this problem. Further, one can imagine creative solutions to the lack of medical resources, like making medical inspections a duty of residents at publicly-funded hospitals, or rewarding PHS Reserve service with some measure of federal loan forgiveness for recent medical school graduates.
3.
While inspections aim to prevent dangerous contagious diseases from entering the country, other measures are needed to improve response capability in the event that an outbreak has occurred. One approach to this would be to improve informational lines of defense – so that those exposed to infected airplane passengers can be quickly notiﬁed and tested. One proposal by the World Health Organization includes a system for requiring airlines to retain passenger lists for periods longer than the incubation period of serious diseases. This requirement would clearly complement anti-terrorism eﬀorts, as it provides one more reliable source of information on the movement of international travelers.395
4.
If we are going to maintain a federal health system in which states are the ﬁrst responders in domestic contagious disease emergencies, then something must be done to ensure that states are able to serve that function in a way that adequately protects their citizens. Though excessive federal involvement in this function would undoubtedly raise objections on the grounds of unconstitutional involvement in state powers, some involvement is necessary. An appropriate analogy here is the state control of public education, with some federal control over basic standards. Few object to imposed standardized testing proposals as an interference with states’ rights, and some form of emergency testing of state and local health systems might also be in order. If states cannot be forced to comply with a basic level of adequate public health protection, then it may still be possible to condition federal funding of subsidized health programs on the maintenance of adequate protection and epidemic event readiness.
Our ability to protect against new threats can only be bolstered by a more vigilant contagious disease
prevention and control system. In the post-September 11 world, it is not absurd to think that a man may
step on a plane with the intent and ability to kill more Americans than were killed even on that day. But
instead of carrying a bomb or a suicide pilot plan, he may carry a weapon in his body, which is undetectable
by screeners, eminently fatal, and completely invisible – smallpox. With people willing to sacriﬁce their
lives for the purpose of killing civilians, the question of weaponization of communicable diseases may not
be relevant. If this possibility seems too far-fetched to be relevant to policy decisions, I would return us to
September 10, and ask whether we would have thought that two planes destroying the World Trade Center
towers and halting capital markets for three days was similarly far-fetched. It may be, as Publius Syrus
wrote, that He is most free from danger, who, even when safe, is on his guard.396
The old and new threats to our safety from dangerous contagious diseases require that we scrutinize our
capabilities to protect against those threats and remedy our deﬁciencies. Today, diseases that have plagued
the world for centuries are again on the rise, and in forms which resist treatment by our most relied-upon
396Williams, Ralph Chester, M.D., The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950. Commissioned Oﬃcers Association
of the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., 1951, pp. 63.
91drugs. The history and experience of American federal control over those epidemic diseases helps us to predict
the problems future epidemics may cause, and provides a rough template for controlling those diseases. The
yellow fever epidemics in the turn of the century South show in stark relief the counterproductive fear
responses of residents in states with ineﬀectual health systems, and the importance of quick and decisive
action. The bubonic plague incidents in San Francisco show the necessity of working with marginalized
minority communities that may be most identiﬁed with epidemic diseases, so that they can cooperate with
health oﬃcials knowing that their health is a primary priority. These experiences, as well as the many more
detailed facets of federal contagious disease control law and policy, can help us to avoid deadly pitfalls as we
move into an era that, in new ways, threatens our society with the diseases of our past.
92Appendix A: Instructions for Federal Medical Inspectors
Reference 93: Public Health Screening at U.S. Ports of Entry, A Guide for Federal Inspectors: U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, APHIS, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Quarantine. Revised
March 2000.
•
The U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) has statutory and regulatory responsibility to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable disease from foreign countries into the United States. Applicable regulations are found in 42 CFR, Parts 34 and 71. These responsibilities are delegated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Quarantine.
•
Quarantine Stations are located at eight major international airports; each Quarantine Station has responsibility for all ports in an assigned geographic area.
•
The Division of Quarantine is empowered to apprehend, detain, medically examine or conditionally release individuals (including U.S. citizens) suspected of having one of the following diseases: Cholera and suspected Cholera, Diphtheria, Infectious Tuberculosis, Plague, Suspected Smallpox, Yellow Fever, and Suspected Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, such as Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean, and others not yet isolated or named.
•
Foreign Quarantine regulations require that the death or illness of an arriving international passenger or crew member be reported by the captain of the arriving ship or airplane to the Quarantine Station having responsibility for the port of entry; however, illnesses are not always reported.
•
Inspection of Arriving Persons: Observe all arriving passengers and crew for signs and symptoms of illness, such as rash, unusually ﬂushed or pale complexion, jaundice (unusual yellowing of skin and eyes), shivering, profuse sweating, diarrhea, and inability to walk without assistance. / A person is considered to be ill in terms of Foreign Quarantine regulations when signs/symptoms meet the following criteria:
1.
Temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit or greater, which is accompanied by one or more of the following: rash, jaundice, glandular swelling, or which has persisted for 2 days or more.
2.
Diarrhea severe enough to interfere with normal activity or work...
•
Detain ill passengers and crew, and ask for details about symptoms and itinerary. At a port of entry where a Quarantine Station is staﬀed, that Station should be notiﬁed and a quarantine inspector will investigate. If there is no quarantine inspector at your port, the appropriate Quarantine Station should be notiﬁed. The Quarantine Station will release or conditionally release the ill person, or, if the circumstances warrant, call a physician to conduct an examination and recommend appropriate action.
•
Check Itineraries: It is sometimes necessary to check the itinerary of arriving persons whether or not they are ill because of a known communicable disease outbreak abroad. Speciﬁc itineraries may be connected with a need for appropriate preventive measures. If this situation should arise, CDC will direct that each arriving person be asked if he/she has been in the infected country within a speciﬁed number of days. If so, the person will either be given printed information or referred to the appropriate Quarantine Station.
93•
Health Alert Notice: A Health Alert Notice (Form CDC 75.8) provides general guidance for travelers arriving from areas where they may have been exposed to a communicable disease. When directed to do so, issue a Health Alert Notice to each arriving person or to each adult in a family group. A Health Alert Notice need not be issued to persons who routinely cross at U.S.-Mexican border and U.S.-Canadian border ports of entry.
•
Medical Inspection of Arriving Aliens: The Immigration Act of 1996 revised the health-related grounds for inadmissibility under Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as of September 30, 1996. Section 212(a) provides that any alien is inadmissible who (1) is found to have a communicable disease of public health signiﬁcance, (2) fails to present documentation of having received vaccination against vaccine-preventable diseases, (3) has or had a physical or mental disorder with associated harmful behavior that poses or may pose a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or (4) is a drug abuser or addict.
•
Medical Documents Missing or Incomplete: Inspectors should immediately advise the appropriate Quarantine Station when an immigrant arrives without medical documents or with incomplete medical documents.
•
X-rays: When processing an alien, DO NOT keep his/her chest X-ray ﬁlm. This is an important medical document that the alien should retain as part of his/her permanent health record.
•
Medical Holds: Refer to the appropriate Quarantine Station all aliens for whom a Medical Hold should be issued. Candidates for a Medical Hold are:
•
All aliens who are not routinely required to have a medical examination and who, upon arrival in the United States, exhibit a physical condition that may be inadmissible under Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
•
All aliens who require a medical examination overseas (immigrants, refugees, ﬁanc´ e[e]s of U.S. citizens and their minor children), but who arrive without evidence or with incomplete evidence of having had one performed, or with documentation that has expired. Satisfactory evidence can consist of a properly completed ’Medical Examination of Applicants for United States Visas’ (Optional Form 157), with results of chest X-ray and serologic tests for syphilis and HIV infection indicated. Chest X-ray and serologic tests are required for aliens 15 years of age and older.
•
The Class A or B Condition Stamp: All aliens with a Class A condition or a Class B condition, including tuberculosis, not infectious; Hansen’s disease (leprosy), not infectious. These aliens should have a stamp imprinted on the face of their visa....Consular oﬃcers should stamp ...when an immigrant has a medical condition of public health concern, but sometimes this step is inadvertently omitted. The inspector should check all [visas], regardless of whether the Attention PHS stamp is present.
•
Refugees and Asylees: Refugees and asylees normally arrive at ports where quarantine inspectors are assigned, but this may not always be the case. Notify the appropriate Quarantine Station of all refugees and asylees entering the United States for the ﬁrst time.
•
Importations of Public Health Importance:
•
Animals: Of the animals commonly kept as pets, only dogs, cats, monkeys, and turtles are speciﬁcally mentioned in the Foreign Quarantine Regulations. Other species are not subject to PHS restrictions. The requirements of other agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, may also have an impact on the entry of pets into the U.S. / The general requirement is that all dogs, cats, monkeys, and turtles intended for importation into the United States shall be visually examined by inspecting personnel. Only those that are free of gross evidence of infectious diseases may be admitted. Animals that show signs of illness (e.g., examined, tested, or treated by a licensed veterinarian at the owner’s expense. Contact the appropriate Quarantine Station when the above conditions are present. Speciﬁc requirements are as follows:
94Cats: Cats are subject only to the general requirements for entry as stated above. No rabies
vaccination or health certiﬁcate is required for entry.
Dogs: Regardless of age, dogs may be released without restriction if they appear to be healthy
and have been exclusively in a rabies-free area for at least 6 months immediately preceding
arrival or since birth. Dogs arriving from countries other than those listed as rabies-free may be
admitted if they meet all of the following requirements:
- Greater than 3 months of age
- Free of gross evidence of infectious disease
- Accompanied by a valid certiﬁcate of vaccination against rabies.
Monkeys and Other Nonhuman Primates:
- Pet Monkeys Banned: Live monkeys and other nonhuman primates
may not be imported for use as pets under any circumstances. They may only be imported
into the United States for bona-ﬁde scientiﬁc, educational, or exhibition purposes. Importers
must be registered with CDC, and are responsible for implementing speciﬁc disease control
measures while the animals are imported and cleared, transported to the importer’s facil-
ities, and quarantined for a 31-day period. Registered importers must also hold a special
permit, issued by CDC, to import cynomolgus, rhesus or African green monkeys.
- Verify Importer Status: Contact the appropriate Quarantine Station when primates are
presented for entry to verify that the importer is currently registered as an importer of non-
human primates and that, if required, a special permit has been issued.
- Illegally Imported Monkeys: If a monkey owned by a passenger arrives hand-carried or
as baggage, isolate the animal and call the Quarantine Station for advice immediately. Do
Not handle the animal or allow others near its enclosure.
- Seizure: Inadmissible nonhuman primates are seized and re-exported to the country of
origin, donated to facilities approved by CDC, or destroyed.
- Animal Acts: Nonhuman primates that are part of a legitimate animal performing act
may, if appropriately registered with CDC, be transported from and returned to the United
States. The CDC registration for these acts is in the form of a letter on CDC letterhead...
95Turtles: Live turtles with a carapace (shell) length of less than 4 inches (measured in a straight
line from front to back) and viable turtle eggs may not be imported into the United States for
commercial purposes. An individual may import turtles of less than 4-inches in shell length
only if the importation is not for commercial purposes and the importation includes no more
than one lot containing fewer than seven live turtles, fewer than seven viable turtle eggs, or
any combination thereof totaling fewer than seven. CDC may issue a permit for an importation
of more than the permitted number when the importation is for a bona-ﬁde noncommercial
scientiﬁc or exhibition purpose. / CDC has no restrictions on the importation of live turtles
with a carapace length of greater than 4 inches.
Goatskin Products from Haiti: Untanned goatskin products from Haiti may not be imported
into the United States because they may carry anthrax. These items must be seized and inciner-
ated. Precautions (gloves and mask, at a minimum) must be observed when goatskin products
from Haiti are handled.
Human Remains: Examine the death certiﬁcate to determine the cause of death. Admit unless
the person died of a quarantinable disease (cholera, plague, yellow fever, infectious tuberculosis,
diphtheria, suspected smallpox, or suspected viral hemorrhagic fever), in which case the casket
must be hermetically sealed. If there is no evidence that the casket is hermetically sealed, hold
and contact the appropriate quarantine station for instructions. Ashes may be admitted without
restriction, regardless of the cause of death.
•
Permits Required for Etiologic Agents and Vectors of Disease: It is impractical to list the several hundred species of etiologic agents and vectors for which a permit is required. The intent of the permit requirement is to control the importation of etiologic agents and vectors and ensure that permitted shipments are adequately packaged. Any shipment for which a permit has been issued may be immediately released. The following classes of imports require a permit issued by CDC:
- Any living insect or other living arthropod known to be or suspected of being in-
fected with any disease transmissible to humans; also, if alive, any bedbugs, ﬂeas, ﬂies, lice, mites,
mosquitoes, or ticks, even if uninfected. This includes eggs, larvae, pupae, and nymphs, as well as
adult forms
- Any animal known to be or suspected of being infected with any disease transmissible to humans
- All live bats
- Unsterilized specimens of human and animal tissue (including blood), body discharges
-and excretions, or similar material, when known to be or suspected of being infected with disease
transmissible to humans
-
Any culture of living bacteria, virus, or similar organism known to cause or suspected of causing human diseases
-
Any snails capable of transmitting schistosomiasis.397
9697